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ABSTRACT 
The United States and its allies have been subjected to clandestine interference 
campaigns led by the Russian government for nearly a century. The targets and 
mechanisms of subversive Kremlin influence have varied over the decades, but themes 
such as seeking to tamper with electoral processes have seen refinement and renewed 
vigor in the 21st century. From the inception of the Soviet Union to the era of Vladimir 
Putin, this thesis investigates the targets and mechanisms of subversive Russian 
influence—with particular focus on election meddling—to identify the greatest U.S. 
vulnerabilities to such interference campaigns. We determined that the Kremlin possesses 
a wide variety of well-honed tools such as disinformation, cyberattacks, and forgeries that 
allow it to apply stress to democratic systems and exploit rival nations’ internal divisions, 
and that it has had success in deploying such tools in a number of Western democratic 
elections since 2014. We find that significant damage to the credibility of elections 
and the U.S. government is a viable vulnerability for Russian interference campaigns, 
and that mounting defensive measures against and mitigation thereof must be a top 
priority for U.S. national and homeland security entities.
v 
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For roughly a century, the United States and its allies have endured coordinated 
efforts by the Soviet, and then Russian government to interfere in the West’s domestic 
affairs. The frequency, intensity, tactics, and targets of these clandestine attacks have 
varied over the years, but the Kremlin’s main goals of information manipulation, societal 
destabilization, reputational harm, and political influence have remained largely consistent. 
The efficacy of Russia’s influence measures has also varied over the decades, but 21st-
century advances in technology and decreased Western focus on Moscow as a major threat 
since the end of the Cold War have allowed these insidious tactics to proliferate in new and 
damaging ways. Left unchecked, Russian influence campaigns could cause severe harm to 
the integrity of future elections and the credibility of U.S. institutions.1 
This thesis studies the history of Soviet and Russian meddling in the domestic 
affairs of the United States and its Western rivals to identify trends in their efforts and 
successes, and examines various recent interference campaigns as a means to understand 
the Kremlin’s subversive attempts to influence foreign elections unduly. Studying the 
gradual buildup of capabilities beginning with the Soviet Union through Russian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, commonalities and signals can be identified that 
highlight the greatest vulnerabilities faced by the United States and other Western 
democracies. Common themes this thesis identifies in both Soviet and modern Russian 
interference efforts include the use of media manipulation, proxy organizations, fabricated 
material, and instigation of specific, opposing groups to provoke division. Other recent 
Western elections and referenda allegedly affected by Russian influence, including 
France’s presidential election the following year, further highlight Kremlin attack patterns. 
Commonalities found in this analysis include hack-and-leak incidents, plots involving 
election infrastructure, and attempts to manipulate voters through disinformation. What 
 
1 Charles E. Ziegler, “International Dimensions of Electoral Processes: Russia, the USA, and the 2016 
Elections,” International Politics; Basingstoke 55, no. 5 (September 1, 2018): 569–71, 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1057/s41311-017-0113-1; Vasu Mohan and Alan Wall, “Foreign 
Electoral Interference: Past, Present, and Future,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs; 
Washington 20 (September 1, 2019): 116. 
xiv 
emerges from this study is a clear signal that credibility of elections and legitimacy of 
government leaders and institutions are imperiled by Kremlin meddling, without a 
comprehensive or practical remedy. 
Investigative findings by bodies including the bipartisan Senate Intelligence 
Committee demonstrate unequivocally that Russia’s preferred influence operation 
outcomes in the 2016 U.S. presidential election came to pass, potentially along with 
“victories” in other elections.2 With nearly a century of experience in covert influence 
techniques and plenty of practice trying to interfere in Western elections, Russia has many 
skills and tools, such as disinformation and cyberattacks with which to continue meddling 
in the democratic affairs of its rivals. The Kremlin has also clearly signaled an intention to 
continue stressing rival nations’ democratic systems with a variety of techniques and 
targets, potentially including rumors of corruption and election fraud, exploitation, and 
exacerbation of domestic civil tensions, and even promotion of secession movements and 
rebellion loom as possible threats. Challenges to the legitimacy of some future elections 
are plausible, bolstered by a variety of well-honed Kremlin tradecraft, such as production 
or dissemination of genuine, doctored, or fabricated material designed to lend credence to 
allegations. 
This thesis chronicles and draws connections between Soviet and modern Russian 
interference techniques to highlight the Kremlin’s capacity and intention to inflict damage, 
such as election-related chaos and the ruination of the credibility of U.S. government 
institutions, leaders, and electoral systems. The examples and conclusions presented in this 
thesis seek to underscore the need for intelligence communities, investigative bodies, and 
other national and homeland security entities to prioritize efforts to identify, thwart, and 
deter Russian interference campaigns going forward, particularly with regard to the 
integrity of the electoral process. 
 
 
2 Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 
U.S. Election Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views, Rep. 116-XX, Senate, 116th 
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For roughly a century, the United States and its allies have endured coordinated 
efforts by the Soviet, and then Russian government to interfere in the West’s domestic 
affairs. The frequency, intensity, tactics, and targets of these clandestine attacks have 
varied over the years, but the Kremlin’s main goals of information manipulation, societal 
destabilization, reputational harm, and political influence have remained largely consistent. 
The efficacy of Russia’s influence measures has also varied over the decades, but 21st-
century advances in technology and decreased Western focus on Moscow as a major threat 
since the end of the Cold War have allowed these insidious tactics to proliferate in new and 
damaging ways. Left unchecked, Russian influence campaigns could cause severe harm to 
the integrity of future elections and the credibility of U.S. institutions.1 
Current Russian President Vladimir Putin is widely regarded as seeking to expand 
his nation’s global influence and regional dominance, as well as to suppress any potential 
threat to his authoritarian grip on power in Russia.2 While Putin may not share his Soviet 
predecessors’ worries about imminent nuclear war with the United States, he does appear 
to retain their bitter mistrust and hostility toward the nation, which he accuses of fomenting 
and financing unrest within Russia along with revolutions in neighboring states.3 Just as 
the Soviet leadership before him did, Putin appears to see weakening the U.S. government 
and its global influence as a key component of Russia’s security and external power goals. 
 
1 Charles E. Ziegler, “International Dimensions of Electoral Processes: Russia, the USA, and the 2016 
Elections,” International Politics; Basingstoke 55, no. 5 (September 1, 2018): 569–71, 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1057/s41311-017-0113-1; Vasu Mohan and Alan Wall, “Foreign 
Electoral Interference: Past, Present, and Future,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs; 
Washington 20 (September 1, 2019): 116. 
2 Robert Person, “Balance of Threat: The Domestic Insecurity of Vladimir Putin,” Journal of Eurasian 
Studies 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 44–45, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2016.11.001; Kari Roberts, 
“Understanding Putin: The Politics of Identity and Geopolitics in Russian Foreign Policy Discourse,” 
International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 72, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 29–30, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017692609. 
3 Vladimir Putin, “Predsedatel Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsiy Vladimir Putin provel zasedaniye 
Koordinatsionnovo soveta Obshcherossiyskovo narodnovo fronta” [Prime Minister of the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin led the Coordination Council of the All-Russia People’s Front], Pravitel’stvo 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Office of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation news release], December 8, 
2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20120607083034/http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/17330/. 
2 
As such, he employs the Kremlin’s military and intelligence apparatus to do so.4 Putin 
appears to believe that his foes engage in similar tactics, likely leading him to see Russia’s 
influence campaigns as necessary, justified, and urgent. He has accused the U.S. 
government of fomenting revolutions in Eastern Europe to disrupt Russia’s regional 
hegemony, aggressively expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to 
Russia’s borders as a direct military provocation, and even attempting to remove him from 
power by leading a clandestine revolt.5 Combined with his apparent fear that Western-style 
democracy could eventually lead to the end of his authoritarian reign, Putin has ample 
motivation to take steps to undermine and weaken the United States and its democratic 
allies. As such, the U.S. government must be aware of and on guard against all of Russia’s 
destabilization efforts.  
The November 2020 U.S. elections provide a case in point.6 These elections took 
place in an environment in which the prospect of Russian interference was of grave concern 
to some voters and dismissed as a hoax by others, following years of reports and 
investigations about alleged Kremlin-backed election infrastructure tampering, 
dissemination of misinformation, and even attempts to incite violence.7  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the greatest U.S. vulnerabilities to Kremlin interference campaigns, 
particularly with regard to elections? 
 
4 Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Russian Roulette: The Inside Story of Putin’s War on America and 
The Election of Donald Trump, 1st ed. (New York: Twelve, 2018, 49, 57–58; Malcolm W. Nance, The Plot 
to Destroy Democracy: How Putin and His Spies Are Undermining America and Dismantling the West, 1st 
ed. (New York: Hachette Books, 2018), loc. 3561–3571 of 5796, Kindle. 
5 Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power 
Aspirations (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017), 15–17, 
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Russia%20Military
%20Power%20Report%202017.pdf?ver=2017-06-28-144235-937; Richard Sakwa, “‘New Cold War’ or 
Twenty Years’ Crisis? Russia and International Politics,” International Affairs 84, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 
257–263, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00702.x. 
6 Richard Clarke, “Counterterrorism Expert Richard Clarke on Trump’s Relations with Intelligence 
Agencies,” NPR, February 17, 2017, http://www.npr.org/2017/02/17/515728608/counterterrorism-expert-
richard-clarke-on-trumps-relations-with-intelligence-age. 
7 University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy and Associated Press-NORC Center for Public 
Affairs Research, Americans Split on Relationship with Russia (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Harris 
School of Public Policy, 2020), https://apnorc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/topline_release1.pdf. 
3 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section focuses on Russia as a saboteur attacking the civil society of other 
nations from within through manipulation of such tools as cyber infrastructure and access 
to information. Because incidents, such as the 2016 U.S. presidential election interference, 
involve such relatively novel mechanisms as cybersecurity and the use of social media or 
alternative news sources, much of the available literature is very recently published.8 A 
consensus apparently does not exist regarding which aspect or target of subversive Russian 
attacks is the most important or dangerous; as a result, the burgeoning array of recent 
sources lacks a cohesive narrative, theme, or focus. 
1. Russia’s Intent, Capability, and Mechanisms 
An abundance of literature dutifully explains Vladimir Putin’s belief that modern 
Russia deserves to be the center of the Slavic and Eurasian world and at least as strong a 
global power as the Soviet Union and Imperial Russia once were.9 Many works credit 
Putin’s adversarial attitude toward the West to a fear that expansion of the NATO military 
alliance is designed to weaken or threaten Russia’s global prominence and its dominance 
of the Eastern European and Central Asian regions.10 Among these writers, prominent 
Russian dissident Garry Kasparov and U.S. historian Walter Laqueur argue that the 
Russian president views his nation’s success and security as a zero-sum game requiring the 
weakening of the United States and its allies, as well as a global acknowledgement that 
many states from the former Soviet territories must remain irrevocably within Russia’s 
 
8 Amos C. Fox and Andrew J. Rossow, “Assessing Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Successful Tool for 
Limited War,” Small Wars Journal 12, no. 1 (August 8, 2016). 
9 Peter Pomerantsev, “Yes, Russia Matters: Putin’s Guerrilla Strategy,” World Affairs 177, no. 3 
(September 30, 2014): 21; Tassos E. Fakiolas and Efstathios T. Fakiolas, “Domestic Sources of Russia’s 
Resurgence as a Global Great Power,” Journal of International and Area Studies 16, no. 2 (December 1, 
2009): 100–101. 
10 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that 
Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, September 30, 2014, 77–79; Douglas Mastriano, “Putin—The Masked 
Nemesis of the Strategy of Ambiguity,” Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 1 (January 20, 2017): 69–70, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1272175. 
4 
orbit.11 According to Laqueur, “Russian government strategy is dominated by the 
American shadow and the conviction that what helps the United States must be bad for 
Russia.”12 By extension, the Kremlin strategy also presupposes that what hurts the United 
States is quite likely beneficial for Russia. 
Many sources emphasize that Putin’s prior career as a foreign counterintelligence 
operative with the KGB13 guides his alleged heavy use of clandestine or obfuscated tactics 
of subversion.14 For example, Malcolm Nance warns, “For [Putin] to succeed at the mission 
of damaging the United States, he will use all tools of the Russian statecraft such as forging 
alliances, but also blackmail, propaganda, and cyberwarfare.”15 Regrettably, Nance’s 
books and a number of other publications on the subject veer out of objective analysis and 
into sharply partisan political rhetoric. For example, Nance indulges his apparent distaste 
for Donald Trump with colorful descriptions, such as “Worse than his mouth was his 
fingers when connected to Twitter. In 140 characters he managed to derail his candidacy 
with insulting, racy, or inappropriate comments,” potentially alienating some readers and 
blurring his analysis with his editorializing.16 With years-long federal investigations into 
whether Russian interference helped Trump defeat Hillary Clinton in a polarizing 2016 
election (and outsized national media coverage thereof), an influx of partisan, biased, and 
emotion-infused works on the topic is not particularly surprising, but must be taken with a 
grain of salt. Without much difficulty, recent mainstream newspaper articles and mass 
market books arguing for and against many Russia-based allegations can easily be found. 
To separate signal from noise and preserve accuracy, this thesis relies on scholarly, peer-
reviewed sources where available. Study of partisan, biased, and speculative works is 
 
11 Garry Kasparov and Mig Greengard, Winter Is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the 
Free World Must Be Stopped, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), 253; Walter Laqueur, Putinism: 
Russia and Its Future with the West, 1st ed. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015), 151. 
12 Laqueur, 151. 
13 Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Byezoapasnosti [the Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security]. 
14 Malcolm Nance, The Plot to Hack America: How Putin’s Cyberspies and WikiLeaks Tried to Steal 
the 2016 Election (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), 24–26; Nance, The Plot to Destroy Democracy, 
loc. 687–701. 
15 Nance, The Plot to Hack America, 36; Nance, The Plot to Destroy Democracy, loc. 687–701. 
16 Nance, Plot to Hack America, 13. 
5 
nevertheless insightful, as the existence of multiple popular public works espousing 
exaggerated dangers, misguided fears, or foolhardy dismissal of legitimate risks could 
work to Russia’s advantage as it seeks to undermine, conceal, and obfuscate. One example 
is a nakedly partisan 2018 work entitled Russia Hoax penned by a longtime Fox News 
anchor, which devotes an entire chapter to downplaying or refuting risks and legal 
questions regarding a controversial meeting between Trump campaign representatives and 
Russian representatives offering “dirt” on Clinton.17 
A study by Kevin McCauley shows how Soviet manipulation techniques have 
evolved into the current threat posed by Putin’s Kremlin.18 This work alleges that in 
addition to launching conspiracy theory-peddling media disinformation campaigns and 
employing online “troll armies” to disparage unfavorable information sources, Russia 
employs targeted destabilization campaigns in a number of NATO and European Union 
(EU) countries in a further effort to weaken or dismantle the alliances.19 Citing reports 
from NATO and the governments of Estonia, Moldova, and the United States, McCauley 
asserts, “The Russian Federation is conducting sophisticated and large-scale 
disinformation campaigns to destabilize U.S. allies and interests” and explains, “Russia 
continues to employ influence methods formulated under the Soviets, as well as integrating 
new information age methods.”20 His conclusions support others warning that Russia uses 
“troll armies” and such other cyber tactics as social media. 
In pursuit of destabilization, Russia has been accused of interfering with elections 
of friend and foe alike, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the United States, Great 
 
17 Gregg Jarrett, Russia Hoax: The Illicit Scheme to Clear Hillary Clinton and Frame Donald Trump 
(Northampton, MA: Broadside Books, 2018), 171–190. 
18 Kevin N. McCauley, Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin 
(North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016).  
19 “Russian troll armies” is a term used to describe networks of internet commentators, allegedly paid 
by the Kremlin and often posing as Westerners, who systematically post propagandistic comments on 
Western news articles and social media in support of Russia or against its foes. 
20 McCauley, Russian Influence Campaigns, loc. 8541–8697. 
6 
Britain (particularly regarding Brexit), and France.21 Mikhail Myagkov, Peter Ordeshook, 
and Dimitry Shakin provide “evidence and eyewitness accounts that even Russian spin 
doctors and those who committed fraud cannot dispute” of fraudulent machinations 
employed to ensure favorable results in both Russian and Ukrainian elections within the 
21st century.22 The same author team reached similar conclusions through a separate 
analysis of the 2004 Orange Revolution in Kyiv.23 Ominously, both the 2009 Forensics of 
Election Fraud and the 2008 Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral 
Manipulation also devote pages to the study of the U.S. vulnerability to election fraud, with 
the latter detailing several mechanisms by which Americans’ confidence in the legitimacy 
of the vote could be shaken. One warning stands out sharply, namely that “in the United 
States since the 2000 election there have been concerns raised regarding electoral 
irregularities—either intentional election fraud or unintentional problems in the election 
that result in an inaccurate (and thus sometimes in the eyes of the losing side, fraudulent) 
outcome.”24 In more detail, the authors assert:  
The ongoing debate about the security of electronic voting technologies 
reflects one aspect of this debate. Concerns have also been raised about 
fraud in absentee voting, early voting, precinct voting, and voting by 
military personnel and overseas civilians… that are all unrelated to the type 
of voting technologies used. Moreover, in the 2002 gubernatorial election 
 
21 Vladimir Socor, “Russia Orchestrates Gagauz Election in Moldova, Ponders the Next Steps,” NGO 
Publication, Jamestown Foundation 12, no. 59 (March 15, 2015), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-
orchestrates-gagauz-election-in-moldova-ponders-the-next-steps/; Luke Harding, “Barack Obama Urges 
Russia Not to Interfere in Neighbouring States,” The Guardian, sec. World news, July 7, 2009, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/07/obama-russia-first-trip; Nance, The Plot to Hack America, 
62; Isobel Thompson, “Did Russia Hack the Brexit Vote?,” Vanity Fair, April 12, 2017, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/did-russia-hack-the-brexit-vote; “France Warns Russia against 
Interfering in Elections,” Radio France Internationale, February 16, 2017, http://en.rfi.fr/france/20170216-
france-warns-russia-against-interfering-elections. 
22 Mikhail G. Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election Fraud: 
Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 139. 
23 Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dimitry Shakin, “Fraud or Fairytales: Russia and 
Ukraine’s Electoral Experience,” Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 91–131, 
https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586X.21.2.91. 
24 R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Susan D. Hyde, eds., Election Fraud: Detecting and 
Deterring Electoral Manipulation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 71. 
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in New Hampshire, there were convictions related to jamming political 
party ‘get-out-the-vote’ telephone banks.25  
Such factors point to a potentially serious security risk. Between Russia’s 
experience, history, and motivation regarding election infrastructure tampering in foreign 
states, and existing latent susceptibility to shaken confidence in U.S. elections, the Kremlin 
has a sizable opening to exploit in its destabilization efforts, and may already be attempting 
to make use of it.  
2. 21st Century Vulnerabilities 
Covert interference can take many different forms, and democratic elections can be 
subverted in a variety of ways from voter suppression and election infrastructure tampering 
to subversive attempts to influence potential voters. Works related to Russian attacks and 
emerging vulnerabilities regarding elections have proliferated in recent years, though some 
topics have garnered considerably more attention than others have. Methods of interference 
Russia has been accused of using to disrupt Western states’ electoral processes successfully 
include the following:  
• hacking as a form of espionage or sabotage 
• the leaking of stolen information 
• propagating false news and propaganda distribution and promotion 
• deployment of online troll armies 
• the financing of fringe candidates 
• release of kompromat (compromising material) to damage a government 
leader or political candidate 
• provocation and support of secession-minded dissidents  
 
25 Alvarez, Hall, and Hyde, 71. 
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Of these tools, one with an abundance of recently produced literature is the topic of 
hacking. Cybersecurity sources from 2014 and earlier seem to focus on the threat to 
infrastructure, military, and intelligence rather than the use of stolen information to tip the 
balance in elections and undermine a particular candidate, party, or entity, but even on this 
topic, a consensus is also lacking. Marc Goodman presents dire warnings of drone and 
pacemaker hacking, as well as a large-scale power grid shutdown, in Future Crimes; 
likewise, Ted Koppel’s Lights Out points out that Russia has already penetrated the United 
States’ power grid network.26 Both of these volumes argue that the U.S. government is not 
adequately equipped to deal with the large-scale disaster that a sustained cyberattack on 
the grid could cause, whether due to legislative inaction or practical limitations. Koppel’s 
caution is particularly dire. He warns:  
The American public are not the only ones unwilling to contemplate, much 
less cope with, the eventuality of a debilitating cyberattack against our 
power grid. The government agencies and civic organizations charged with 
enabling the nation to recover from catastrophe are also woefully 
unprepared.27 
Such lack of readiness could be due to any or all of the same failures (imagination, policy, 
capabilities, and management) identified in the 9/11 Commission Report regarding the 
federal government’s inability to stop the novel terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; 
indeed, each of these are alleged to some degree in Goodman and Koppel’s works.28 
Though books, reports, and studies critical of U.S. government inaction and lack of 
preparedness against state-sponsored hacking threats are increasingly prevalent, works 
analyzing existing shortfalls and capabilities are less abundant but beginning to emerge. In 
March 2020, a congressionally sponsored group called the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium 
 
26 Marc Goodman, Future Crimes: Inside the Digital Underground and the Battle for Our Connected 
World, First Anchor Books Edition (New York: Anchor Books, 2016), 43, 338–341; Ted Koppel, Lights 
Out: A Cyberattack, a Nation Unprepared, Surviving the Aftermath, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 
2015), 71–72. 
27 Koppel, Lights Out, 92. 
28 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton and U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 9/11 Commission Report: The Official Report of the 9/11 Commission and Related 
Publications (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html. 
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Commission released a report detailing risks, outlining challenges, and recommending a 
strategy of “layered cyber deterrence” U.S. government agencies could adopt to mitigate 
its cyber-based vulnerabilities.29 The report contained more than 80 recommendations for 
U.S. government entities on the topics of structural reform, cultivation of enforcement 
tools, and promotion of resilience and collaboration with the private sector, though it 
remains unclear how many will be adopted. A consortium of U.S. government agencies 
attempted to conduct a 2020 exercise of a large-scale state-sponsored cyberattack with 
kinetic effects and produce an interagency after-action report, but the COVID-19 pandemic 
scuttled these plans.30  
Works covering the spread of false information—“fake news”—have become 
abundant since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, to include information deliberately 
spread by suspected Russian actors. A 2017 paper from Stanford University states:  
Recent evidence shows that: 1) 62 percent of U.S. adults get news on social 
media; 2) the most popular fake news stories were more widely shared on 
Facebook than the most popular mainstream news stories; 3) many people 
who see fake news stories report that they believe them; and 4) the most 
discussed fake news stories tended to favor Donald Trump over Hillary 
Clinton.31  
A key challenge to such recent studies is the fact that the fake-news environment 
continually changes in the era of social media; as awareness of fake-news campaigns and 
the associated risks grow, governments and media entities adapt to contain them, while 
purveyors rapidly adapt to the restrictions and entrepreneurs capitalize on dissent. For 
example, social media platforms Facebook, Twitter, Reddit and YouTube each took a 
number of escalating measures between 2017 and 2020 in reaction to novel fake-news 
tactics, but still drew criticism in the process and sometimes had to roll back certain actions 
 
29 Cyberspace Solarium Commission, Report (Arlington, VA: Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 
2020), https://www.solarium.gov/report. 
30 “National Level Exercise 2020,” Federal Emergency Management Agency (blog), July 23, 2020, 
https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/planning-exercises/nle/2020. 
31 Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 2 (February 16, 2017): 212, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211. 
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in response to the backlash.32 At the same time, such rival platforms as Gab and Parler 
have emerged specifically as an alternative for social media users frustrated by the 
restrictions of the industry’s titans.33 As a result, many recent works studying the 
environment of fake news and social media have become quickly outdated, and exist 
mainly as an incomplete snapshot in time inside a rapidly changing ecosystem. As a case 
in point, two 2020 studies on Facebook’s internal efforts to combat fake news, while 
insightful and not without merit, each focused on measures the company modified, 
improved, or replaced just months later in response to newer threat information and public 
feedback regarding its policies.34 
Books, think-tank reports, and a number of government hearings and reports 
highlight Russia’s role in disinformation campaigns, including fake news and 
 
32 An example of measures rolled back due to criticism include Twitter’s October 2020 decision to 
rescind its ban on the sharing of a controversial article about U.S. presidential candidate Joe Biden and his 
son. The veracity of the article’s assertions had been heavily questioned and some U.S. lawmakers had 
warned of a high probability that its genesis had been a Russian disinformation campaign, though the 
official reason for Twitter’s ban (and the blocking of Trump administration and congressional accounts that 
attempted to share it) was that the article contained private personal information and material allegedly 
gleaned from a hack. The reversal came after withering criticism and accusations of politically motivated 
censorship from President Trump and lawmakers from his party. The official reason given by Twitter was 
that the article had received so much attention that the information therein was no longer technically 
“private,” and it did not publicly explain whether its stance on the allegations that it came from hacked 
material had changed. Paul Mena, “Cleaning up Social Media: The Effect of Warning Labels on Likelihood 
of Sharing False News on Facebook,” Policy & Internet 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2020): 166, 
https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.214; Petros Iosifidis and Nicholas Nicoli, “The Battle to End Fake News: A 
Qualitative Content Analysis of Facebook Announcements on How It Combats Disinformation,” 
International Communication Gazette 82, no. 1 (February 1, 2020): 74, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048519880729; Catherine Sanz and Catherine Thorbecke, “What Social Media 
Giants Are Doing to Counter Misinformation This Election,” ABC News, October 18, 2020, 
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/social-media-giants-counter-misinformation-
election/story?id=73563997; Kevin Roose, “Facebook and Twitter Dodge a 2016 Repeat, and Ignite a 2020 
Firestorm,” New York Times, sec. Technology, October 15, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/technology/facebook-twitter-nypost-hunter-biden.htm; Kate Conger 
and Mike Isaac, “In Reversal, Twitter Is No Longer Blocking New York Post Article,” New York Times, 
sec. Technology, October 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/technology/twitter-new-york-
post.html. 
33 Craig Timberg and Isaac Stanley-Becker, “QAnon Learns to Survive—And Even Thrive—After 
Silicon Valley’s Crackdown,” Washington Post, October 28, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/28/qanon-crackdown-election/. 
34 Mena, “Cleaning Up Social Media”; Iosifidis and Nicoli, “The Battle to End Fake News”; Conger 
and Isaac, “In Reversal, Twitter Is No Longer Blocking New York Post Article.” 
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propaganda.35 The House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services 2015 hearing 
Countering Adversarial Propaganda and the Committee on Foreign Affairs’ hearing 
Confronting Russia’s Weaponization of Information from later that year provide a glimpse 
into the U.S. acknowledgement of Russia’s campaign to harm the West through targeted 
information.36 In the former, a member of the U.S. government’s Broadcasting Board of 
Governors testified:  
With Russia, much of the propaganda that surfaces is aimed at destabilizing 
the West, undermining the trust and credibility of journalism, of 
government, of NATO, of EU, and all those things…the Russian 
propaganda aimed at the non-Russian audiences aimed at undermining 
NATO, EU, government, media…is a very scary destabilizing influence if 
it is actually having the impact—and it is a seeping impact—onto the 
audience.37 
The latter went much further, beginning with a stark warning from Russian propaganda 
expert Peter Pomeranstev, who explained that while Russia knew it was no match for 
NATO in physical combat: 
what if the Kremlin could bypass NATO militarily, make war without ever, 
officially at least, firing a shot? What if it could use the very openness of 
democracy’s open markets, open culture and, very importantly, open 
information against us? So over the 21st century, Russian military theorists 
developed a theory of what they called information psychological or hybrid 
war—a mix of media, economic and cultural warfare with a dab of covert 
military action.38 
Witnesses at the hearing also explained how such a strategy was enacted through a wide 
array of tools to include what Pomerantsev described as “bankrolling and lending political 
support to both far right and far left parties” to create instability in Western nations, 
 
35 Marcel van Herpen, Putin’s Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). 
36 House Committee on Armed Services, Countering Adversarial Propaganda: Charting an Effective 
Course in the Contested Information Environment: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats 
and Capabilities, House of Representatives, Hrg. 59, serial 97-493, 114th Cong., 1st sess., 2015; House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Confronting Russia’s Weaponization of Information: Hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, serial 114-37, 114th Cong., 1st sess., 2015. 
37 H.R., House Committee on Armed Services, Countering Adversarial Propaganda, 15. 
38 H.R., House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Confronting Russia’s Weaponization of Information, 5–
6. 
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weakening U.S. influence and NATO power, and working to “sow divisions, demoralize 
and disorganize—to weaponize information.” Such reports illustrate that while the U.S. 
government may not have had remedies for Russian destabilization efforts in the mid-
2010s, it was not necessarily unaware of the threat thereof. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis studies the history of Soviet and Russian meddling in the domestic 
affairs of the United States and its Western rivals to identify trends in their efforts and 
successes. My analysis requires a study of the known threats, adversarial tactics, and 
vulnerabilities and the Kremlin’s apparent goals, to identify possible unmet needs for U.S. 
security and intelligence entities to use in countering Russian interference.  
This thesis studies various recent interference campaigns as a means to understand 
the Kremlin’s subversive attempts to influence foreign elections unduly. After studying the 
gradual buildup of capabilities beginning with Soviet Union, I explore the case of 
established Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections and trace Russia’s actions to 
identify commonalities or signals to ascertain better the greatest vulnerabilities Russia has 
an opportunity to exploit. Common themes I identified in both Soviet and modern Russian 
interference efforts include the use of media manipulation, proxy organizations, fabricated 
material, and instigation of specific, opposing groups to provoke division. I also compare 
the 2016 U.S. election case to other recent Western elections and referenda allegedly 
affected by Russian influence, including France’s presidential election the following year. 
Commonalities found in this analysis include hack-and-leak incidents, plots involving 
election infrastructure, and attempts to manipulate voters through disinformation. What 
emerges from this study is a clear signal that the credibility of elections and legitimacy of 
government leaders and institutions are imperiled by Kremlin meddling, without a 
comprehensive or practical remedy. 
D. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
In Chapter II, I outline the evolution and refinement of Russian interference 
campaigns from their genesis in the early days of the Soviet Union through to the era of 
Putin’s second decade in power to highlight the scope and seriousness of the threat faced 
13 
by the United States and its Western allies. Chapter III is an in-depth look at how the 
Kremlin’s refined disinformation system was deployed within the U.S. 2016 presidential 
election campaign, along with similar actions in EU member states’ elections. In Chapter 
IV, I examine the fallout from Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign 
to determine plausible damage scenarios the United States may encounter if it fails to deter 
or mitigate against ongoing and future Russian disinformation efforts effectively. 
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II. A CENTURY OF KREMLIN INTERFERENCE: 
DIRTY TRICKS PAST AND PRESENT 
Russia’s present capabilities and strategies to destabilize rival governments are the 
product of a long history of refinement. This chapter chronicles three elements of Soviet 
influence campaigns: media manipulation, secret proxy organizations, forgeries and 
rumors, and manipulating and instigating multiple groups to distrust and attack each other. 
The present analysis then shows how such methods have evolved into the contemporary 
threat toolbox, which still features media manipulation and proxy organizations while 
adding novel cyberattacks as a force multiplier.  
A. THE ORIGINAL THREAT 
From its inception in the 1920s, the Soviet Union developed and refined a 
sophisticated series of subversive actions and manipulation techniques to employ against 
the United States and its allies. The Kremlin’s main security agencies (in various 
incarnations including Cheka, NKVD, KGB, GRU, and FSB) have dedicated official 
departments to carrying out these attacks, known primarily as “active measures,” for 
example, “dezinformatsiya”—disinformation.39  
In a Cold War-era study of the long history of Soviet disinformation campaigns, 
Roy Godson and Richard Shultz defined “active measures” as: 
influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in 
its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and 
discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental 
opponents. This frequently involves attempts to deceive the target… and to 
distort the target’s perceptions of reality.40 
 
39 Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, all referred to herein using common anglicized 
transliterations of their Russian-language acronyms. “Cheka”—1917–1922, All-Russian Extraordinary 
Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption; “NKVD”—1922–1943, 
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs; “KGB”—1954–1991, Committee for State Security; “GRU”—
1991–present, Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation; “FSB”—1995–present, Federal 
Security Service of the Russian Federation. Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active 
Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984); Isikoff and Corn, Russian 
Roulette. 
40 Shultz and Godson, 2. 
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“Dezinformatsiya” was one of the principal tools of a broader campaign to alter 
perceptions and attitudes in ways that benefited the Soviet Union, and proved to be one of 
its most insidious weapons. With the strategic use of this discipline, Moscow could cause 
covert damage in the West without drawing it into a potentially catastrophic armed conflict, 
and support behaviors and policy changes in rival states where threats and diplomatic 
entreaties could not succeed.  
1. Media Manipulation 
One of the earliest examples of calculated manipulation of Western audiences 
involved compromising a trusted source within a prominent American newspaper: The New 
York Times. In the 1930s, Times columnist Walter Duranty won a Pulitzer Prize for 
descriptions of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin and conditions of life under his rule, but 
subsequent research reveals that his articles ranged from hagiographic to deeply 
disingenuous.41 Duranty produced deliberately inaccurate dispatches from his post within 
the Soviet Union that aggressively contradicted reports of a brutal famine in the country’s 
western regions (this mass starvation, known as Holodomor, is now widely believed to 
have been a purposefully created genocide conducted by Stalin against Ukrainian 
peasants).42 Duranty not only presented a deceptively rosy picture of Ukrainian life in his 
articles during the time of mass famine, but also actively sought to discredit accurate 
Western reporting on it.43 Most notably, he forcefully refuted the accurate press releases 
of Gareth Jones, a British reporter for prominent newspaper The Times whose subsequent 
murder was allegedly carried out by Soviet secret police ordered to put an end to his 
 
41 S. J. Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist: Walter Duranty, The New York Times’s Man in Moscow (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Askold Krushelnycky, “Ukrainians Want Pro-Stalin Writer Stripped 
of Pulitzer,” The Guardian, sec. World News, May 4, 2003, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/04/russia.usa. 
42 Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987), 320. 
43 Conquest, 320. 
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negative reporting.44 Duranty’s attempts to destroy Jones’s credibility hint that his Soviet 
benefactors had both the intent and the means to influence Western opinion both through 
false information and the suppression of factual information it found unpalatable.  
By all appearances, Duranty’s actions were not the work of an objective, honest 
journalist, working independently without bias or coercion. Duranty enjoyed a lavish 
lifestyle during his tenure as a journalist in Moscow, to include awards and praise bestowed 
on him by Joseph Stalin.45 By all appearances, the Soviet government made concerted 
efforts to ensure that its relationship with Duranty was a positive one with “benefits” to 
both sides; in a country known for its iron grip on control of the domestic press, the fact 
that Stalin praised and likely courted a renowned Western reporter is a telling sign of the 
Kremlin’s strategy of information manipulation abroad. 
According to Robert Conquest, Duranty may have had other incentives to write 
articles in service of the Soviet Union beyond being seduced by the opportunity to boost 
his career with interviews and unrivaled access to Stalin; he was possibly being 
blackmailed as well.46 In one of the earliest potential examples of Soviet manipulation of 
Western citizens through kompromat, it has been alleged that Stalin’s secret police used 
knowledge of Duranty’s opium abuse and participation in bisexual orgies to ensure that his 
journalistic missives were acceptable to, if not laudatory of, the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union.47  
According to Duranty biographer S. J. Taylor, Duranty’s Soviet-friendly New York 
Times articles influenced President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1933 decision to grant 
 
44 Marco Carynnyk, “The Famine the ‘Times’ Couldn’t Find,” Commentary Magazine, November 1, 
1983; Ray Gamache, Gareth Jones: Eyewitness to the Holodomor (Cardiff, Wales: Welsh Academic Press, 




46 Krushelnycky, “Ukrainians Want Pro-Stalin Writer.” 
47 Kompromat is a Russian-language term for a political tool attributed to the Soviet and Russian 
government in which negative information about an individual, usually a politician or public figure, is 
obtained, cultivated, or manufactured for use in discrediting, intimidating, or blackmailing the individual. 
Krushelnycky, “Ukrainians Want Pro-Stalin Writer.” 
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diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union.48 Notably, Roosevelt’s recognition of the 
Soviet Union was contingent on a guarantee from the Soviets that they would not interfere 
in domestic American affairs or disseminate propaganda within U.S. territory; the U.S. 
government already suspected such an agenda.49 Declassified State Department documents 
show that diplomatic relations between the two nations soured within months of the 
recognition, as “evidence emerged that the Soviet Government had violated its pledge not 
to interfere in American domestic affairs” along with reports of state-sponsored killings 
known as “The Great Purge.”50  
Manipulation of the press to benefit the Soviet Union was a feature of 
dezinformatsiya in neutral states as well. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report 
revealed that the Soviet Union managed to place more than 160,000 messages into India’s 
ostensibly free press between the 1960s and 1980s by using several hundred bribed or 
compromised journalists across at least six English-language papers.51 The smuggled notes 
of KGB dissident Vasili Mitrokhin later corroborated this report that indicated that no 
fewer than 10 Indian papers were under Kremlin control by 1973 and more than 5,500 
KGB-tailored articles appeared in Indian papers in 1975 alone.52 Along with allegedly 
outright coercing individual journalists to do their bidding, the Soviets also exercised other 
types of influence, both overt and clandestine, over foreign press to amplify their 
disinformation.53 The CIA report describes two methods by which disinformation made its 
way into prestigious Indian papers that relied on credible sources. In one method, Soviet 
operatives debuted fraudulent articles in smaller and less-heralded publications—for 
 
48 Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist. 
49 “Recognition of the Soviet Union, 1933,” in Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations: 
1921–1936 (Department of State Office of the Historian, 2009), https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-
1936/ussr; Richard Gribble, “United States Recognition of Soviet Russia: 1917–1933—Church and State 
Responses,” American Catholic Studies 119, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 21–51. 
50 “Recognition of the Soviet Union, 1933.” 
51 Director of Intelligence, The Soviets in India: Moscow’s Major Penetration Program,” Intelligence 
Assessment (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1985), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00586R000400490007-7.pdf. 
52 Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili N. Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and 
the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 324. 
53 Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 39. 
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example, the communist press—and then encouraged journalists at English-language 
publications to pen their own articles using these planted articles as sources. In the other 
method, the Soviets placed their articles directly into Indian press and wire services whose 
managers they had bribed and then used these services’ bylines to add cover and 
legitimacy. 
Such operations undoubtedly served to influence domestic Indian public 
perceptions, yet they carried another key benefit with even greater value for the Kremlin. 
These tactics gave the Soviets the ability to publish rumors, insinuation, and disinformation 
under respected Indian newspaper mastheads and then cite them as “neutral” international 
sources in disinformation campaigns throughout the globe.54 By cloaking their damaging 
rumors and disinformation in the credibility of neutral foreign press, the Soviets could 
appear to merely amplify objective information, and thus infect Western audiences that had 
long since learned not to trust any accusations originating directly from Moscow. In one 
notable instance, a 1968 hoax—alleging that the U.S. military had been spreading 
weaponized epidemics in Vietnam and Thailand—was introduced by the Mumbai-based 
Free Press Journal and amplified in a weekly publication called Blitz.55 This fabrication—
fake news before the age of fake news—was based on a forged U.S. Office of Naval 
Research letter produced by the KGB active measures division known as “Service A” and 
gained enough traction and credibility from its coverage in the Indian press to achieve 
republication in the London Times.56 Popular acceptance of this slanderous fabrication 
fueled anti-U.S. military sentiment that may still linger to this day, as persistent rumors 
 
54 Director of Intelligence, “The Soviets in India”; Nicholas J. Cull et al., Soviet Subversion, 
Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West Fought against It: An Analytic History, with Lessons for 
the Present (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017), 22, 33–36, 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/assets/documents/arena/2018/Jigsaw-Soviet-Subversion-Disinformation-and-
Propaganda-Final-Report.pdf. 
55 Max Holland, “The Propagation and Power of Communist Security Services Dezinformatsiya,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 12, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600500332342; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 
318. 
56 Holland, 12; Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and 
Propaganda, 1986–1987 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1987), Proquest.  
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about U.S. military use of biological weapons may well have roots in stories based on 
Soviet sources.57 
As shown in the alleged coercion or bribery of Walter Duranty, a key component 
of Soviet disinformation efforts was the courting and financing of Western journalists to 
promote a Kremlin-approved counter-narrative. Allegations and proven cases of such 
attempts throughout the Cold War abound, with the case of French journalist Pierre-Charles 
Pathé standing out as one of the most high-profile instances.58 French officials observed 
Pathé, regarded as an expert on Soviet affairs by prominent French media outlets, in 1978 
conducting a clandestine meeting with a KGB agent, when he was given money and 
documents instructing him on points and themes he was expected to publish under his own 
name.59 Upon his subsequent trial and conviction, it became known that he had spent 20 
years in the service of the KGB disinformation campaign and published articles under 
pseudonyms as well as in his own name. His Soviet-financed publications included a 
journal called Centre d’Information Scientifique, Economique et Politique and a newsletter 
called Synthesis, described as highly influential to the French political elite.60 An analysis 
of the majority of Synthesis editions by Godson and Shultz revealed, along with multiple 
articles attempting to pin the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), several key themes amplifying Soviet positions, including:  
fostering mistrust among the NATO allies and their friends, denigrating 
Western weaponry and defense policies, criticizing French policy vis-à-vis 
American and NATO political and defense arrangements, and expressing 
distrust of and censuring the United States.61  
 
57 Holland, “Propagation and Power of Dezinformatsiya,” 13. 
58 Sean M. Dixon, “Finding the Limit: The Strategic Potential of the Network-Based Actor” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 10–13. 
59 Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili N. Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive 
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The Kremlin had evidently cultivated Pathé’s reputation as an expert on Soviet 
affairs in part by feeding him information and funding, and in part, by exploiting his status 
as the son of a prominent French filmmaker.62 Once his credibility and bona fides were 
thus established, the subsequent propaganda and false information published under his 
name carried an air of legitimacy in the Western world far greater than the Soviets were 
able to achieve through their dissemination of overt propaganda. 
2. Secret Proxy Organizations 
Another early method of interference in domestic American affairs was Soviet 
support for such foreign communist organizations as the Communist Party of the United 
States of America (CPUSA). As shown by its own records (retrieved from Russia by 
emissaries from the U.S. Library of Congress after the fall of the Soviet Union), the CPUSA 
worked with its Kremlin financiers to exploit disaffected or oppressed segments of the U.S. 
population as early as the 1920s.63 Such targeting included farm workers hit hard by the 
Great Depression and Black citizens suffering under oppressive Jim Crow discrimination. 
These efforts netted such victories as the recruitment of popular African American actor, 
singer, and sportsman Paul Robeson to promote, amid much contemporary controversy, 
the Soviet cause as superior to the oppressive U.S. government.64 In the CPUSA and other 
ostensibly domestic organizations, the Kremlin cultivated valuable covert means to recruit 
spies, allies, and unwitting assistants, and to manipulate and exacerbate U.S. social unrest 
in support of its interference objectives.65 
 
62 Pathé’s father Charles was a famous, successful businessman known for popularizing phonograph 
records and essentially pioneering the film industry in early 20th century France, and he invented many 
popular techniques and tropes along the way. The media production and distribution conglomerate he 
created, Pathé Frères, has remained in operation since 1896. Shultz and Godson, 135. 
63 Deb Riechmann, “Retrieved Papers Shed Light on Communist Activities in U.S.,” The Billings 
Gazette, January 30, 2001, http://billingsgazette.com/news/world/retrieved-papers-shed-light-on-
communist-activities-in-u-s/article_bd5e5ca5-38b7-5dcd-b645-b203cbaa0445.html. 
64 Scott Martelle, The Fear within: Spies, Commies, and American Democracy on Trial (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 193–196, Proquest.  
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After anti-communist sentiment in the United States began to crest at the onset of 
the Cold War, the Soviets made extensive use of international and multinational front 
organizations; many of them ostensibly dedicated to such laudable causes as disarmament 
or world peace.66 This more subtle approach enabled the KGB to recruit potential 
sympathizers and unwitting allies who not only worked intentionally or directly to aid the 
Kremlin, but also gave the Soviet Union Trojan Horse-like propaganda dissemination and 
information gathering outlets within countries where overt Soviet influence would not be 
tolerated.67 Perhaps the best known of these organizations is the World Peace Council 
(WPC), founded in 1950.68 Along with such partners as the World Federation of Trade 
Unions and the dubiously named World Federation of Democratic Youth, the WPC led 
protests throughout Western democratic nations for several decades and published 
materials intended to generate mass anger against U.S. weapons development.69 
Specifically, these organizations produced inflammatory and spurious literature falsely 
accusing the United States of such crimes as conducting biological warfare in the Korean 
War.70 These organizations were later used to foment domestic and international outrage 
against U.S. activity in the Vietnam War, followed by a sustained campaign to discredit 
and split or dissolve NATO including hosting an annual “Stockholm Conference on 
Vietnam” and supporting “anti–neutron-bomb” protests in European NATO member 
states.71 Perhaps tipping their hand, these organizations nearly unanimously ignored the 
Soviet military buildup and such Soviet-dominated alliances as the Warsaw Pact. When 
they had to acknowledge them, these organizations defended them as Soviets’ “alliances,” 
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as well as being a necessary defensive posture, even as they called for U.S. disarmament 
in the interest of global peace.72 
3. Forgeries and Rumors 
Yet another method used by the Soviet Union to sway popular opinion and breed 
mistrust of the U.S. government among U.S. and allied citizens was through the creation 
and planting of forged documents and letters.73 Soviet-made materials with meticulously 
mimicked Western handwriting, syntax, and signatures were disseminated both by Soviet-
compromised publications, and by neutral or anti-Soviet publications duped by the 
fabrications; for example, the 1968 Office of Naval Research epidemic weapon forgery 
carried by the Indian press.74 Contentious and painful social issues within U.S. society, 
such as the civil rights struggle, a rash of high-profile assassinations, and heated arguments 
about the U.S. military’s role in the Vietnam War, were popular targets for forgery and 
slander attacks. Manipulation of the press to introduce or reproduce the KGB-generated 
allegations and false documents played a key role in helping rumors, doubt, and lies to 
spread throughout U.S. society.  
According to Mitrokhin, the KGB launched a campaign to reduce the influence of 
nonviolent civil rights champion Martin Luther King, Jr. in favor of Stokely Carmichael, 
whom the Soviet Union saw as more radical and likely to incite violence and division.75 
KGB leaders authorized implantation of articles in English-language newspapers in 
African countries slandering King, ostensibly written by Black opponents of his ministry 
and movement.76 Hoping these articles would be reprinted in U.S. newspapers, Soviet 
authors used such incendiary Western racial terms as “Uncle Tom” to describe King, and 
produced forged documents indicating that he was a paid mole injected into the movement 
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by the Johnson administration.77 When King’s assassination the following year led to 
nationwide unrest and riots, the disinformation department quickly reversed course and 
began using its press operations to hail King as a martyr whose murder traced back to U.S. 
government attempts to silence him.78  
Concurrently, the Mitrokhin archive chronicles KGB financing and assistance to 
publishers and authors responsible for advancing conspiracy theories that the CIA 
orchestrated the 1963 assassinations of Kennedy and his killer, Lee Harvey Oswald.79 In 
hopes of capitalizing on popular mistrust created by President Richard Nixon’s career-
ending Watergate scandal a decade later, the disinformation department also created and 
circulated a forged request for information—ostensibly from Oswald—to disgraced 
Watergate operative and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt, in an effort to further imply 
that the CIA was behind Kennedy’s murder.80 Though the KGB’s clumsy use of initials in 
this forgery led some readers to conclude erroneously that a right-wing oil magnate with 
the same surname was its ostensible recipient, the letter’s subsequent publishing and 
“verification” by multiple handwriting experts helped accomplish the main goal of 
convincing some Americans that CIA operatives had killed the President.81 
Similar forgery efforts sought to frame FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover on a variety of 
fronts, including that he was alternately a right-wing extremist, a corrupt abuser of the FBI 
office, and even a secret transvestite bent on seeding the FBI with fellow homosexual 
activists.82 Though some of the more outlandish insinuations against Hoover may have 
failed to gain mainstream credibility initially, such allegations as unproven speculation 
regarding Hoover’s sexual preferences gained widespread acceptance within U.S. society 
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and have continued to resurface for decades.83 The lack of definitive evidence regarding 
aspects of Hoover’s personal life makes it difficult to ascertain for certain whether Soviet 
operatives invented such stories or simply used its disinformation techniques to capitalize 
on existing rumors or even facts. Regardless, such techniques amplified public awareness 
of controversial Hoover rumors at the very least, and demonstrate that Kremlin interference 
efforts included both disinformation and amplification of legitimate information it felt was 
advantageous yet getting insufficient attention organically.  
4. Manipulating Multiple Sides, Instigating Groups against Each Other, 
and Inciting Violence 
In some cases, Kremlin subversive measures sought to create kinetic impact and 
create physical casualties. Evidence of such attempts highlights the multi-faceted nature of 
Soviet interference techniques and the multilateral danger to U.S. interests presented 
therein. For example, Mitrokhin’s smuggled KGB archive details a diabolical plot to 
exacerbate racial tensions in the 1960s, seeking not just to provoke conflicts and arguments 
or influence political narratives but actually to incite violence within U.S. society. One of 
the most alarming examples is a 1971 plot, codenamed “Operation Pandora,” to detonate 
an explosive device at a predominantly Black college in New York and anonymously call 
several Black organizations attributing the explosion to the Jewish Defense League 
(JDL).84 Mitrokhin’s notes indicate that this idea was not an isolated one but rather one 
element of an elaborate campaign to incite a deadly race war between Jewish and African-
American communities. To accomplish this plot, the Soviets produced insulting racist 
material made to look like it was written by the JDL and distributed the letters to militant 
black power groups. Along with these forgeries, the Soviets sent anonymous letters to 
African-American organizations listing made-up atrocities against the Black community 
committed by the JDL, and calling Black citizens to retaliate violently against the league’s 
leadership. Whether such plots were designed to harm the future electoral prospects of 
presidents Lyndon Johnson or Nixon, tarnish the U.S. reputation internationally, or simply 
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to cause ongoing division or chaos as a more general goal is unclear, but each is plausible 
in the context of concurrent Soviet disinformation schemes. Whatever the aim, attempts to 
create tangible impacts and casualties added a dangerous new dimension to Soviet 
interference operations beyond propaganda, bribes, and disinformation. 
5. Diminishing Returns, Lasting Impacts 
Moscow’s various strategies in its interference campaigns during the Cold War 
demonstrate the breadth and adaptability of its subversive influence arsenal, but such 
diversity may have been born of necessity or pragmatism as some of its most successful 
tools began to lose power with repeat usage. Most of the Soviet active measures and 
disinformation tactics achieved varying levels of success over the course of the Cold War, 
but many waned in effectiveness as targets began to identify them or at least grow 
reasonably suspicious. For example, Western observers eventually caught on to the robust 
forgery operations, and occasionally managed to undermine their effectiveness by shining 
a light on the practice. One such failed operation was a KGB attempt to deflect blame for 
a 1981 assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II away from itself and onto the CIA. 
In this incident, two forgeries purported to be cables from the U.S. embassy in Rome were 
published by a communist-friendly Italian newspaper, but quickly discredited due to 
formatting errors and correctly labeled a “Soviet active measure” by other Italian 
newspapers.85 Another diabolical yet ineffective operation involved sending forged letters 
purportedly from the Ku Klux Klan to African and Asian nations ahead of the 1984 
Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles warning that Black athletes would be shot, 
burned, or lynched if they attempted to compete.86 Such apparent misfires do not indicate 
a broader failure of Soviet influence operations, however. To the contrary, the presence of 
seemingly unsuccessful attempts amid a series of successes merely indicates that the 
Kremlin’s subversion strategy involves placing a large number of low-risk bets, or lighting 
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a series of small flames to see which ones ignite into destructive fires. It is also notable that 
some attempts, such as the Kennedy assassination forgery project, lay dormant for years 
before eventually bearing fruit and enduring for decades. 
Despite growing Western awareness of Soviet dezinformatsiya and U.S. efforts to 
challenge it aggressively under Ronald Reagan’s administration, many active measures 
plots continued to achieve some degree of success, even during the tentative thaw in U.S.-
Russia relations, and even after being positively identified as disinformation. In 1983, the 
KGB published a fake letter in Patriot, an Indian newspaper formed two decades earlier 
with Soviet aid for the purpose of seeding disinformation.87 The letter, ostensibly from an 
American scientist who wished to remain anonymous, claimed that the burgeoning human 
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) virus had 
been developed by the Pentagon as a biological-weapons experiment.88 After the letter 
initially failed to gain international attention, a spurious scientific paper crafted by Kremlin 
loyalists in East Germany was issued to bolster it, with Soviet press deliberately 
misidentifying the paper’s origin as French to further obscure the Kremlin connection.89 
While other Soviet proxies around the world spread stories related to and building on the 
Pentagon/AIDS myth, traditional Soviet media in turn amplified them, and by 1987, the 
story had been shared in more than 30 languages and 80 countries.90 More than 35 years 
since the Soviet Union set out to convince the world that the U.S. government had created 
the AIDS virus, and more than 25 years after the KGB admitted the entire ploy, U.S. and 
global public health officials and medical workers continue to struggle against popular 
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acceptance of the fabrication and the knock-on consequences of it.91 For example, a 2005 
study revealed that more than one out of every four African-Americans surveyed believed 
that AIDS was produced in a government laboratory, and that more than 15 percent of 
respondents believed the government had created the virus to control or reduce the Black 
population.92 As demonstrated by political controversy that jeopardized mass acceptance 
of a potential COVID-19 vaccine among U.S. citizens during a global pandemic in 2020, 
conspiracies that undermine the credibility of government administration of health 
resources, or frame the government for disease outbreaks, can have significant and durable 
negative political and public health impacts.93 
B. CONTEMPORARY ADAPTATIONS AND NEW THREATS 
Russian active measures and disinformation against the West did not end with the 
demise of the Cold War. Indeed, modern Russian influence campaign methods build on 
Soviet active measures and exploit new technology that appears to increase their 
effectiveness. This section borrows the framework of the previous section to demonstrate 
how recent Kremlin interference operatives have adopted and adapted the techniques of 
their forebears, and to highlight areas in which such tools may be even more potent today.  
1. Media Manipulation 
Sinikukka Saari noted in 2011 that Russia’s “active measures” influence strategies 
were evolving to include: 
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1) Proactive political involvement, e.g. creating links to a variety of political 
actors, assisting reorganisation and coordination of pro-Russian parties, 
export of political technologies and consultation around elections, 2) ‘NGO 
diplomacy’ e.g. creating and assisting pro-Russian youth groups, minority 
and separatist civil organisations and think tanks, [and] 3) Creation and 
management of favourable media environment, e.g. the establishment of 
Russian media ventures, launching media campaigns in the Russian media, 
or influencing the local national media.94 
To Saari’s last point, modern Russian media ventures have been used as an integral tool in 
its interference campaigns against Western democracies, overtly operating within the states 
it seeks to influence.  
Since 2005, the Russian government has operated and expanded its own 
international media outlets, for example the television and online video enterprise RT 
(originally called Russia Today) and the internet-based news and commentary agency 
Sputnik. Both widely regarded by Western intelligence sources as mouthpieces of official 
Kremlin propaganda, these outlets have established multi-language ventures throughout 
the world and used a range of marketing strategies to build a substantial public audience. 
RT, Sputnik, and other government-sponsored Russian outlets with an international 
outreach mission provide factual coverage and interesting content on a variety of topics, 
yet they also clearly support agendas and messages that the Kremlin wishes to spread.95 
These outlets amplify news and opinions Russia wishes to promote, whitewash or cast 
doubt on the veracity of negative stories involving Russian interests, promote 
conspiratorial theories and interpretations, and give remarkably high amounts of coverage 
and airtime to representatives of political groups and parties seen as controversial or 
“fringe.”96 Opinions Russia wishes to promote with its news broadcast networks include 
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denigration of NATO and defense of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean 
peninsula.97 Examples of conspiracy promotion include attempts to portray the shootdown 
of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, said to be done accidentally by Kremlin proxies in 
occupied east Ukraine with a Russian anti-aircraft missile, and GRU agents’ alleged 
poisoning of a former Russian spy in Great Britain, as deliberate acts perpetrated by rivals 
scheming to frame and slander Moscow.98  
At times, Russian officials have openly acknowledged these media outlets’ purpose 
as a powerful tool or even weapon against the Western world. In explaining the importance 
of RT’s American TV channel in 2011, editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan appeared to 
hint at the network’s role as a strategic defense weapon: 
It’s important that there is a channel that people are used to, that they like, 
so then when you need to, you show them what you need to show them. In 
a sense, not having your own “inoveshaniye” [foreign broadcasting] is the 
same as not having a ministry of defense. When there is no war, it seems as 
though it is not necessary. But damn, when there is war, it’s absolutely 
critical. But you can’t create an army a week before the war begins.99 
In a satellite video appearance with the president of Argentina commemorating the 
beginning of RT’s Spanish-language broadcasting in South America in 2014, Putin himself 
stated, “With accelerated development of electronic media, this sphere has acquired 
immense importance and has perhaps become a formidable weapon to potentially 
manipulate public consciousness.”100 
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It is no surprise, then, that an interagency report on Russian interference published 
in 2017 by the Director of National Intelligence concluded that RT and Sputnik are key 
components of “Russia’s state-run propaganda machine” and a vital tool in its foreign 
influence campaigns.101 
According to a 2019 study from King’s College London analyzing all English-
language content produced by RT and Sputnik during two four-week periods in 2017 and 
2018, the Kremlin news agencies flooded the market with more than 2,100 articles 
highlighting political dysfunction in Western countries and Ukraine, which represented 
81.7 percent of all content the agencies wrote about these nations.102 Of the March 2018 
RT and Sputnik articles studied, a staggering 138 of them sought to sow confusion and 
doubt about the Kremlin’s recent poisoning of a former spy in the United Kingdom, in 
many cases by offering competing and contradictory counternarratives, such as lies that the 
U.S. or British government created the Novichok poison used in the attack.103 Such 
misdirection and noise are hallmarks of RT and Sputnik’s defense of Kremlin scandals, 
particularly regarding infamous large-scale incidents such as the Russian military’s seizure 
of the Crimea peninsula and the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17.104 The anti-
Ukrainian rhetoric and dishonesty coming from Russia’s English-language RT channels in 
London and the United States during these two events were so prolific and reprehensible 
that two of its anchors publicly resigned out of frustration with the network’s deceptive 
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reporting, while a third forcefully condemned the network’s disinformation campaign on 
air during a live broadcast.105  
Disturbingly, the King’s College report also discovered that RT and Sputnik’s 
English-language content infected British news sources as well; 21 different articles across 
five prominent British newspapers in an eight-week sample replicated at least 30 percent 
of the text found in articles that RT or Sputnik had published previously, including 11 
directly related to political issues.106 Only two of the 21 articles gave credit or attribution 
to the earlier RT or Sputnik articles, meaning British audiences had no reason to suspect a 
Kremlin-friendly bias. Taken alongside other studies’ findings, for example a report that 
conspiracy-minded U.S. media outlet InfoWars had republished more than 1,000 RT 
articles, it appears that the old Soviet method of publishing stories with the hope that 
Western media outlets would later amplify their messages is now more successful than 
ever.107 
Government-run propagandistic media outlets represent only the tip of the iceberg 
of Russia’s modern-day foreign influence apparatus, however. Beneath the surface, the 
Kremlin also appears to continue employing such practices as co-opting journalists and 
covertly manipulating the foreign press, playing puppet master to proxy organizations 
designed to stir up social divisions, fabricating and spreading false information, and 
providing material and financial support to foreign political candidates and campaigns.108 
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a. Co-opting Journalists and Using Outside Media to Influence News 
Coverage 
Echoing past Soviet use of Indian, East German, and African publications to hide 
its authorship of disinformation, the internet is awash with obscure and low-level news 
portals throughout the world that fail to disclose the editorial control or influence of the 
Kremlin. In particular, the FSB and Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian 
General Staff (GRU), work with loyal supporters to enact this scheme.109 Hungarian news 
media website Hídfő.net, whose content was eventually found to have been almost entirely 
produced by Russia’s GRU, was used to dramatic effect in a Kremlin campaign to turn 
Ukraine’s neighbors against its fledgling post-revolutionary government.110 The site 
caused a massive uproar by falsely reporting that Hungarian tanks had been seen rolling 
across the Ukrainian border.111 The site also published false assertions regarding such 
topics as Crimea-related sanctions, the 2016 U.S. presidential election, NATO aggression, 
and an “exposé” alleging a U.S.-run hybrid war campaign against its rivals.112 As in Soviet 
times, the site’s articles could be cited by the Russian media as though it were a credible 
foreign news source, without the stories appearing to be state-generated propaganda.  
b. Inventing and Planting Stories in the Internet Age 
As the hidfo.net incident illustrates, the Kremlin is able to leverage such significant 
technological advances as the internet to enhance the efficiency and expand the reach of 
Soviet disinformation tools. In a hyper-connected digital age in which much of the world 
receives information from sources outside traditional news networks, Russia is now able 
to accomplish its goals of spreading disinformation without needing to explicitly 
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compromise or exploit journalists or news publications, nor even to create its own Western-
leaning information portals. The advent of social media, in particular, has helped modern 
Russian influence campaigns reach an exponentially wider audience than Soviet operations 
were able to, and with considerably less difficulty and risk.  
Since at least 2013, active measures harnessing the power of the internet and social 
media to stoke artificial public interest in a topic, spread disinformation, and attack 
Russia’s foes have proliferated.113 Novaya Gazeta, a Moscow newspaper whose critical 
investigative work since Putin rose to power is believed to have prompted the assassination 
of several of its prominent employees, reported in August 2013 that its journalists had 
infiltrated a St. Petersburg “troll factory” called Internet Research Agency (IRA).114 The 
IRA offered weekly salaries and free food to employees for writing blogs, article 
comments, and social media posts on prescribed themes.115 According to this exposé, 
young Russian citizens working for the agency were given a list of topics and targets about 
which to produce content across Russian and Western traditional and social media.116 
These topics included praise for Putin, the Group of Twenty (G20) summit (held in St. 
Petersburg that year), and Russian activity in the Syrian war, along with negative content 
directed at Russian opposition politician Aleksei Navalny, Forbes magazine, and various 
American entities. Burnished by other media reports corroborating these findings, the 
Novaya Gazeta investigation discovered that similar operations were planned for or already 
working in Moscow, and also found evidence that the agency’s influence campaign 
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predated its July 2013 business registration.117 Subscribers to British newspaper The 
Guardian complained that the online comment section of articles related to Ukraine’s 
ongoing revolution were all so inundated by a torrent of Kremlin-friendly propaganda that 
legitimate conversation was impossible.118 A May 2014 column filed by The Guardian’s 
readers’ editor in response recalled that the newspaper had reported two years earlier about 
Russian troll influence campaigns, implying that it had subsequently become a target of 
such attacks.119 Indeed, a February 2012 Guardian report about hacked emails to and from 
the leader of a Russian political youth organization, many of which dated back at least to 
2010, outlines a well-financed campaign to amplify pro-Russia internet content and smear 
a list of 168 enemies of the organization, including Navalny, journalists, and human rights 
activists, on social media and blog sites.120 
A 2018 RAND Corporation analysis posits that the Kremlin’s interest in social 
media information warfare may have stemmed from Putin believing that such mass unrest 
incidents as the 2011 Moscow post-election protests and various revolutions in former 
Soviet republics had been fomented by the United States and coordinated via Facebook 
and Twitter.121 These U.S.-based social media platforms were widely reported as critical 
tools for the launch and coordination of revolutionary uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia that 
same year, which Putin decried as U.S.-orchestrated interference in his speech justifying 
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the annexation of Crimea.122 This perception may have cemented Putin’s resolve to build 
up Russia’s so-called “information confrontation” capability to counter what he believed 
to be a grave new American threat. Though a number of studies later found that the role of 
social media in the Arab Spring had been somewhat overstated, the 2014 Ukrainian 
revolution that prompted Putin’s seizure of Crimea would have nevertheless proven this 
hypothesis anyway.123 The mass demonstrations in Kyiv that year began with a journalist’s 
Facebook post and relied heavily on social media to organize protests, recruit volunteers, 
and capture the attention of the Western world.124 
Following The Guardian’s report, and increasingly cognizant of robust pro-Russia 
sentiment within the comment sections of prominent news sites, the American news media 
gradually began to take notice of the story. News and entertainment aggregator site 
Buzzfeed published a lengthy exposé in June 2014 that used leaked emails from alleged 
troll factory financiers to describe the Russian troll operation in great detail.125 The feature 
showed the troll factory to be a well-financed and sophisticated operation and revealed 
attempts to hire English tutors for employees, a list of such media targets as Politico and 
Fox News, and orders for employees to operate six active Facebook accounts or 10 Twitter 
accounts and post 50 comments to news sites per day. Yet, in response to the Buzzfeed 
article, a Washington Post column highlighting the newspaper’s own interaction with 
suspected Kremlin trolls downplayed the impact of the alleged influence campaign and 
suggested that domestic commentators were clever enough to mock, refute, or ignore any 
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false claims from foreign invaders.126 Though many outlets reported on the troll campaign 
as a nuisance offshoot of Russia’s adventurism in Crimea, none seemed at the time to 
recognize it as a threat to U.S. domestic affairs, and neither did prominent U.S. officials. 
By April 2015, “malicious cyber activity” was well known and taken seriously 
enough that President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13694: Blocking the Property 
of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities. This order 
was a directive declaring a national emergency and threatening harsh sanctions on any 
foreign actors whose cyber activities threatened U.S. national or economic security, 
financial stability, or foreign policy.127 Regrettably, in what now seems like a colossal 
oversight and missed opportunity, the focus around this executive order did not appear to 
include Russian troll activity. Rather, the text of the executive order centered on such 
contemporary events as financial cyber crimes, state-sponsored Chinese hacking for the 
purposes of espionage and intellectual property theft, ISIS propaganda and recruitment 
through social media, and an incident in which North Korea levied a crippling hacking 
operation on Sony Pictures in retaliation for its production of a film depicting the 
assassination of Kim Jong Un.128 Notably, Obama attempted to correct this oversight in the 
waning days of his presidency by issuing Executive Order 13757: Taking Additional Steps 
 
126 The Washington Post article focused on flagrantly absurd Russian comments, summarizing one 
thusly: “Halloo, egghead! Let’s go! “Oink-oink-oink-oink-oink …” hahaha-haha-ha….))))))))))) [He then 
launches into an anti-American screed in Russian.],” as well as typical banter, such as a seemingly 
domestic commentator rapidly responding dismissively to a comment that Obama should avoid 
involvement with Ukraine-Russia conflict. It did not appear to account for the possibility of more subtle 
efforts to stir up division without revealing pro-Russian bias. Caitlin Dewey, “Hunting for Paid Russian 
Trolls in the Washington Post Comments Section,” Washington Post, June 4, 2014, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/06/04/hunting-for-paid-russian-trolls-in-the-
washington-post-comments-section/. 
127 Barack Obama, Executive Order 13694, “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in 
Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,” Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-blocking-property-
certain-persons-engaging-significant-m. 
128 Robert Hackett, “Sanctions: America’s Best New Weapon against Cyber Crime,” Fortune, April 2, 
2015, http://fortune.com/2015/04/02/us-cyber-crime-sanctions/; David E. Sanger and Katie Benner, “U.S. 




to Address the National Emergency with Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled 
Activities to amend Executive Order 13694 after Russia’s 2016 election interference.129 
2. Proxy Organizations 
Just as the Soviet Union was able to implant advocates for its causes and policies 
into foreign states’ political and social environments via surrogates such as the CPUSA 
and WPC, modern Russia offers support and assistance to (and sometimes creates) proxy 
organizations in the West. This strategy includes support for oft-discounted political parties 
in other countries, including neo-Nazis and white supremacists.130 As in the Soviet past, 
this support and these alliances had nothing to do with shared ideology and everything to 
do with perceived usefulness to national goals; especially regarding potential collaborators 
who could assist against a shared enemy. Just as with the leaders of Cuba, North Korea, 
Vietnam, and such non-communist nations as Egypt and Iraq during Soviet rule, the key 
question was who was the enemy. The enemy of Moscow’s enemy (the West and the 
United States) was thus the Kremlin’s friend.131 
András Rácz describes Russia’s strategy as “scattershot… placing small bets, 
directly or through proxies, on ready-made fringe groups in an effort to destabilize or 
simply disorient” such rivals as the EU.132 An Atlantic Council report titled The Kremlin’s 
Trojan Horses agreed and warned that Russia was waging a subtle destabilization effort 
focused on:  
(1) building political alliances with ideologically friendly political group 
and individuals, and (2) establishing pro-Russian organizations in civil 
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society, which help to legitimate and diffuse the regime’s point of view. The 
web of political networks is hidden and nontransparent by design, making 
it purposely difficult to expose. Traceable financial links would inevitably 
make Moscow’s enterprise less effective: when ostensibly independent 
political figures call for closer relations with Russia, the removal of 
sanctions, or criticize the EU and NATO, it legitimizes the Kremlin’s 
worldview. It is far less effective, from the Kremlin’s point of view, to have 
such statements come from individuals or organizations known to be on the 
Kremlin’s payroll.133 
The appearance of Russia’s support for fringe groups is alarming for a variety of 
reasons, especially its apparent effect of amplifying far right, ultranationalist, and even 
neo-Nazi parties and organizations in Slovakia, Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, and 
other Western nations.134 Alleged beneficiaries of Russian support include members of 
European Parliament representing such far-right or nationalist parties as Alternative for 
Germany and France’s National Rally (formerly National Front), as well as such agitator 
organizations as Austrian Technologies GmbH and Italy’s Eurasia Coordination Project.135 
A common thread among the majority of these disparate fringe groups with Kremlin 
backing has been their assertion that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was legitimate and that 
the sanctions levied as a result of it should be repealed.136 Another use for this hodgepodge 
of policy-agnostic alliances also seems to be their members’ participation as monitors, 
neutral observers, or official recognizers of elections in Russia or its intended sphere of 
influence, where they can dubiously vouch for or cast doubt on the elections’ credibility 
and fairness.137  
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These parties and groups can also be used to cause problems domestically, for 
example, sowing domestic unrest and stymieing the work of their nations’ governments 
from within using veto power or obstructionism. Even support for less successful fringe 
parties has a detrimental effect on the nations in which they practice. In October 2016, 
septuagenarian neo-Nazi Istvan Gyorkos, leader of a small organization known as the 
Hungarian National Front, murdered a police officer during a raid on his illegal weapons 
cache in a western Hungarian village.138 A parliamentary committee later briefed on the 
incident by the intelligence community was informed that Gyorkos had been under 
surveillance for years due in part to collaboration with extremists in Russia, and that 
Russian GRU military intelligence personnel posing as diplomats had regularly engaged in 
combat drills with him and his followers.139  
Support for a tiny militant and antagonistic party in Hungary seems duplicitous 
considering the warm relations already established between the Kremlin and both 
Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban, and his leading challenger, the Jobbik Party.140 
Russian support for groups that glorify or co-opt the fascist ideology of the Soviet Union’s 
bitterly hated World War II opponent seems even more jarring. These seeming 
contradictions, however, underscore the assertion that Russia is willing to place small bets 
on a plurality of parties, so long as they show signs of being able to weaken the powers 
that be or disrupt the European status quo. Since such support is pragmatic and sinister 
rather than ideological, even groups with policies and worldviews antithetical to those of 
the Russian government may still receive assistance. Such is the case throughout Europe; 
political parties strongly rumored to have Russian backing in Germany include the left-
leaning Social Democratic Party, hard-left Die Linke, and far-right Alternative für 
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Deutschland.141 In Greece, the ruling far-left Syriza party has come under fire due to its 
rumored Russian financing and ties to such radical Russian nationalists as Alexander 
Dugin, who is also accused of supporting far-right neo-Nazi opposition party Golden 
Dawn.142 The story is similar in Italy, where the resurrected center-right Forza Italia party 
and right-leaning nationalist Lega Nord parties are both believed to enjoy Russian 
backing.143 The United Kingdom’s British National Party and UK Independence Party 
have drawn suspicion on this subject as well due to the effusive praise heaped on Putin by 
some of their members and the alleged Russian interference in their favor during the Brexit 
referendum.144 The evident promiscuity of Russia’s foreign political support, even to 
multiple fringe candidates within a single country, reveals that an aspect of the Kremlin’s 
strategy is to amass a large number of levers to pull in the name of destabilization and 
ability to impose its will on foreign governments; it is accumulating spoilers and trump 
cards wherever it can.  
Alarm bells about Russian influence sounded in Spain almost immediately upon an 
explosion of chaos and violence centered on a secessionist movement in Catalonia in 
September 2017. Citing Catalonian disinformation, Russian media amplification, and 
Russian Twitter bots’ frenzied sharing of both, Spanish media quickly speculated that a 
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Kremlin hand had been stirring the pot.145 Subsequent reports from German and Spanish 
intelligence agencies later found that a surge of Russian disinformation and support had 
indeed been a key provocation for Catalonia’s illegal separatist referendum and the bloody 
riot that followed.146 
The 2016 Internet Research Agency Facebook advertisements included a series of 
conservative-targeting posts calling for Texas’s secession from the Union; a campaign that 
all but disappeared after the election but may have intensified had Clinton won.147 On the 
other end of the political spectrum, RT reported within one month of Trump’s victory that 
an “embassy” dedicated to California’s secession from the United States had been opened 
in an expensive area of downtown Moscow.148 Contemporaneous reporting from more 
credible news outlets revealed that the California secessionist behind this apparent stunt 
was a New York-born Russophile and Russian resident with a history of right-wing U.S. 
political activism.149 It was soon discovered that the dubious diplomatic outpost managed 
to secure its improbable real estate bonanza only because the space was being provided for 
free by a Kremlin-financed party that was also supporting a fledgling Texas rebellion.150 
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The Anti-Globalization Movement of Russia, as this group is called, exists to offer support 
and encouragement to separatists in nations all over the world.151  
At a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing regarding Russia’s social media 
influence campaigns in November 2017, Russia was accused of using social media bots, 
state media amplification, and even clandestine financial and material aid to support and 
amplify recent secession movements.152 Among these campaigns were Catalonia’s 
contentious unauthorized referendum against Spain in 2017, a narrowly defeated 2014 
referendum regarding Scotland’s independence from the United Kingdom, the United 
Kingdom’s unexpected 2016 vote to exit the European Union, illegal sham referenda in 
Crimea and Ukraine’s Donbass region in 2014, and activity in other “frozen conflict” 
zones.153 Evidence presented at this hearing suggested that Russia also attempted to 
provoke Hawaiian, Puerto Rican, and Native American tribal rebellion in addition to the 
Texas secession.154 Russian support for secession movements serves as evidence of a broad 
trial-and-error strategy. That Russia appears to have directly advocated violence and fear 
among U.S. citizens and attempted to coordinate confrontations between rival groups in 
2016, further reinforces the notion that they are experimenting with ways to stoke 
something akin to a civil war or unrest reminiscent of Soviet race war plots in the 1960s.155 
This notion is further bolstered by such stunts as an incendiary Internet Research Agency 
troll group called Black Fist funding self-defense classes for African-American activists 
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throughout the United States ahead of the election.156 With sometimes-violent unrest 
popping up in cities across the United States in 2020 over coronavirus mitigation measures, 
political campaigns, election results, and social justice issues—including at least one foiled 
plot to assassinate a state governor and provoke a rebellion—some of Russia’s longshot 
bets have a legitimate chance of paying out to some degree.157 
3. New Threats and Force Multipliers: Cyberattacks 
In addition to the resurgence of active measures techniques that appeared dormant 
in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, new tactics have emerged as 
complements and accelerants to such measures in present-day influence campaigns. In 
many cases, longstanding interference methods have adapted and improved, often with the 
benefit of technological advances, such as the internet and social media. Espionage, 
reconnaissance, propaganda distribution, recruitment, and many other elements of 
interference tradecraft have been made much easier and more successful by the availability 
of data and social media on the internet. Contemporary Russia has thus been able to expand 
greatly the size and scope of its activities compared to Soviet influence efforts. Along with 
legal means of information harvesting and dissemination, Russia uses the internet as a 
powerful new toolset for its influence campaigns: cyberattacks, to include hacking, 
infrastructure disruption, and file manipulation.  
Twenty-first-century Russian hacking operations have proven to be useful 
disruptors in their own right, as well as accelerators for other influence methods, such as 
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slander, forgery, and political influence. The information obtained from a hack can be used 
to inform future influence campaigns, identify vulnerabilities and strategies that can be 
exploited and countered, or to embarrass or compromise the target upon public release.158 
Worse yet, the stolen material can even be doctored to create compromising material where 
none naturally exists.159 The theft or even insinuation of theft of sensitive information can 
be used as blackmail if release is threatened. Finally, attribution of a cyberattack’s origin 
can be difficult, so a perpetrator can avoid detection, and thus also avoid consequences. It 
is in this space that Russian influence campaigns have been masterful. Cyberattacks are 
now a staple of the Kremlin’s influence campaigns, whether targeting a nation’s 
candidates, election systems, government services, or even critical infrastructure sectors.160 
The ways in which any hostile power could conceivably disrupt infrastructure or 
commerce grows with every new interconnected device and advance in networking, limited 
only by a potential attacker’s capacity and the intended victim’s ability to thwart, punish, 
or effectively counterattack. By this metric, the threats posed by Russian cyberattacks are 
among the most severe imaginable, as the GRU has spent years honing its craft. Also in 
the Kremlin’s favor is the fact that its nuclear weapons arsenal provides the ultimate 
strategic defense against a physical or military counterattack to its cyber meddling; an 
advantage very few of the world’s other hackers and groups can boast. As the full range of 
possible cyberattack capabilities is too broad to list, it may be more useful to analyze 
actions allegedly already taken by Kremlin agents. 
A bellwether case study for the havoc Russian-origin cyberattacks can wreak on a 
society is a 2007 Estonian cyberattack. In the wake of Estonian authorities’ decision to 
move a controversial Soviet World War II memorial from downtown Tallinn to a military 
cemetery, and fueled by disinformation on Russian-language media saying the monument 
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was set to be destroyed, riots among the Russian-language population ensued. The 
following night, Estonian network systems were beset by a weeks-long siege including 
computer script-driven “distributed denial of service” (DDoS) attacks that caused sporadic 
outages in the banking, media, and government sectors, to include failure of automated 
teller machines, public servant email accounts, and news broadcasts. In a taunting and 
unpersuasive denial, Putin wryly suggested the attack might have been the work of 
independent “patriotic hackers” motivated by love for Russia and incensed at the 
exaggerated news of the statue’s removal rather than official state actors.161 The Russian 
government refused to assist Estonian law enforcement’s investigation of the perpetrators 
despite a standing treaty compelling them to do so, and significant evidence that the attack 
originated with Russian IP addresses.162  
This incident, which rattled Estonian society and led the government to bolster its 
cybersecurity posture significantly, offered an example of the unpredictable chaos Russia 
could unleash on a foe under the guise of domestic tensions and difficult-to-attribute 
cyberattacks. The attack also put Russia’s potential foes on notice that the nation is capable 
of inflicting substantial damage on a rival society without crossing a border or firing a shot. 
Perhaps most troubling to U.S. observers, the Estonian attack hinted at Russia’s apparent 
ability and willingness to wound a NATO member state at a significant level without 
triggering the alliance’s Article Five agreement, which states that an attack against any 
member is an attack against all and must be met with a unified response.163  
Perhaps less risky for Russia though is the following option: a hybrid campaign that 
cripples essential services in a NATO country via a devastating yet difficult to definitively 
attribute cyberattack, yet does not involve physical weaponry deployment or border 
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incursion. Such a “gray area” attack could trigger alliance infighting and a lack of 
consensus regarding a full-scale Article Five response, thus undermining the alliance’s 
main purpose. Perhaps cognizant of such a novel scenario, NATO quickly founded the 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence in Tallinn not long after the 2007 
Estonian cyberattack.164 More than a decade after the Estonia incident, however, ambiguity 
continues to surround each NATO member’s stance on the threshold a cyberattack must 
hit before signifying an act of war. Questions include whether it makes a difference if the 
attack is definitely state-sponsored or possibly carried out by its “patriotic” residents (as 
Putin has smugly suggested more than once), and whether it is definitively safe to declare 
a cyberattack an act of war while also engaging in offensive cyber activity, such as Stuxnet 
(a malicious cyber worm of alleged U.S. and Israeli origin used to damage Iran’s nuclear 
program severely).165 A June 2017 statement issued by NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg in the wake of a mysterious global cyberattack hinted that questions still remain 
even as the alliance seeks to harden its cyber defenses, as he warned those responsible that 
NATO nations had agreed that a cyberattack could trigger Article Five (emphasis 
added).166  
Notably, the attack Stoltenberg referred to (known as “NotPetya”) originated in 
Ukrainian tax software and wreaked havoc on the nation in a manner similar to the 2007 
Estonia attack, before spreading sporadically and uncontrollably to public and private 
sector entities worldwide. U.S. CIA and British intelligence reports identified with high 
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confidence the GRU as the perpetrator for this attack, which concurred with earlier 
Ukrainian intelligence assessments.167  
Whereas NotPetya may have been an out-of-control juggernaut affecting as many 
sectors as possible, Russia has demonstrated that it can also target infrastructure and 
communications equipment with precision. In June 2015, 12-channel French television 
network TV5 Monde was hit with a devastating cyberattack that appeared to have been 
meticulously tailored to destroy its broadcast transmission hardware.168 Seven different 
components simultaneously fell under attack, including a Netherlands-based remote-
control camera company used by the network. The network website was maliciously 
reprogrammed to display a message indicating the Islamic State took credit for the 
mayhem, but French authorities quickly traced the attack to the GRU.169 Six months later, 
a well-coordinated and highly sophisticated remote takeover of multiple Ukrainian power 
grid control center distribution systems, later attributed to the GRU by the UK Cyber 
Security Centre, shut off power to hundreds of thousands of residents in western 
Ukraine.170 The GRU has also been blamed by Western governments for a litany of 
infractions to include a pre-war attack on Georgia’s government agency systems in 2008, 
the penetration of various Eastern European countries’ defense ministries in 2014, and a 
significant 2015 network takeover and data destruction attack against Germany’s 
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Bundestag parliamentary system.171 In light of the broad array of cyber-based disruptions 
it has been practicing and refining, it is clear the Kremlin has a new toolset to deploy 
strategically as a means to sow division, influence, or thwart communications during a 
critical event or time period, and disrupt the normal functioning of a foreign government. 
For example, Russian operatives could unleash a precise, narrowly targeted attack against 
a media network during an election cycle that could materially affect voters’ ability to 
access information about a candidate or result, or a targeted attack on critical infrastructure 
in a given municipality that could cause chaos and disruption at polling locations and 
undermine the integrity of the outcome.  
4. Relative Impunity 
When confronted with the fact that more than a dozen GRU operatives were under 
criminal indictment in the United States for cyber-based election interference, Putin denied 
that the suspects worked for the Russian government, demanded the United States reveal 
its evidence, and bluntly swore that Russia would never cooperate with other nations’ 
attempts to prosecute its hackers: “Never. Never. Russia does not extradite its citizens to 
anyone.”172 By always denying responsibility for cyberattacks and refusing to extradite or 
cooperate with investigations, the Kremlin has mostly escaped consequences for these 
intrusions thus far, which has allowed them to enjoy a measure of freedom to test and refine 
their capabilities. Similarly, the risk of prosecution for an army of citizens paid through 
proxies to create and amplify disinformation on social media and hide behind fake foreign 
personas is low due to the high volume of content and relative anonymity of its operatives. 
Any rival nation’s attempt at in-kind retaliation would likely be thwarted by the Russian 
government’s strict control of the internet within its borders, which allows it to block any 
 
171 Bennetts; Patrick Beuth et al., “Cyberattack on the Bundestag: Merkel and the Fancy Bear,” Die 
Zeit, sec. Digital, May 12, 2017, https://www.zeit.de/digital/2017-05/cyberattack-bundestag-angela-merkel-
fancy-bear-hacker-russia#fancy-bear-cyber-attacks-info-2-tab; Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, 
“Times’s Moscow Bureau Hit by Attempted Hacking,” New York Times, sec. Technology, August 24, 
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/technology/new-york-timess-moscow-bureau-was-targeted-
by-hackers.html. 
172 Josh Lederman, “Putin: Russia Will ‘Never’ Extradite Citizens Accused by U.S.,” Associated 
Press, sec. United States, March 4, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/c5180bffb84d424ba11cf3384a665eb5. 
50 
content it chooses swiftly.173 Finally, Russia’s support and cultivation of fringe parties and 
organizations in rival states in some cases may give it allies capable of thwarting 
investigations into its interference, vetoing penalties such as sanctions, and sponsoring or 
attacking legislation to suit the Kremlin’s interests.174 Taken in aggregate, it becomes clear 
that in the current environment, Moscow has a large array of well-honed interference tools 
and little to dissuade it from using them.  
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III. ELECTION INTERFERENCE 
This chapter focuses on a Russian interference attack type that may have the 
greatest potential for destructive, lasting impact: meddling and manipulation in the process 
of electing leaders in democratic societies. Russia’s methods of foreign political 
interference were on full display in such pivotal world events as the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, the “Brexit” referendum regarding Great Britain’s membership in the EU, and 
other elections throughout Europe. Just as in Soviet times, some of the primary goals of 
this interference appear to include the weakening of Western rivals and alliances such as 
NATO, the promotion of leaders with favorable attitudes toward Moscow, attacks smearing 
politicians seen as hostile toward Russia, the deflection and denial of Russia’s role in 
nefarious events, and the stoking of mistrust and division in Western societies.175  
To understand U.S. vulnerability to Russian election interference and establish the 
plausibility of the threat, this chapter first details known instances of Soviet attempts to 
influence U.S. politicians and tilt the scales toward a Kremlin-favored outcome. Next, it 
analyzes the broad range of tools that Russia used in its bid to influence the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. Finally, this chapter explores other recent instances of Russian 
meddling in Western elections to identify tactics and efficacy further. 
A. SOVIET MEDDLING IN U.S. ELECTIONS  
During the Cold War, Moscow made overt offers to potential U.S. presidential 
candidates on multiple occasions by offering to help them defeat anti-Kremlin rivals in 
exchange for the expectation of friendly treatment. For example, John Bartlow Martin 
reported in 1977 that Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic Party candidate whose unsuccessful 
1952 and 1956 campaigns included nuclear nonproliferation rhetoric that Kremlin officials 
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saw as beneficial, reported one such overture.176 According to Stevenson, Soviet 
ambassador Mikhail Menshikov set up a one-on-one meeting ahead of the 1960 
presidential election to persuade him to run against sitting Vice President Richard Nixon.177 
To Stevenson’s alarm, the ambassador offered to use the Soviet press to help him win 
election, in part by publishing either positive or critical stories about the campaign; 
whichever Stevenson thought would get him the most votes.178 
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev later acknowledged that he continued to do 
everything in his power to prevent Nixon from winning the 1960 election, citing as 
motivation animosity following an infamously tense exchange between the two at an 
American technology exhibition the year before.179 Aleksandr Feklisov, a Soviet spy 
serving as the KGB’s Washington, DC, station chief during this time, later admitted to 
having been “instructed… to propose measures, diplomatic, propagandist, or other, to 
encourage [John F.] Kennedy’s victory” and revealed that an agent had attempted to offer 
assistance to Kennedy’s campaign against Nixon through his brother Robert F. Kennedy.180  
Upon meeting President Kennedy for the first time after his victory, Khrushchev 
took credit for tipping the close race by bragging that he had weakened Nixon by refusing 
to release American pilots from Soviet captivity until after the election.181 When Nixon 
again ran for president in 1968, Soviet intervention attempts were even more direct. 
Anatoly Dobrynin, Moscow’s ambassador to the United States at the time, admitted 
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carrying out an order to offer campaign assistance secretly to Nixon’s opponent Hubert 
Humphrey including financial aid.182 Mitrokhin also notes that even after Nixon’s 
resignation due to the Watergate scandal, then-KGB chairman Yuriy Andropov ordered his 
bureau to make overtures to officials in Nixon’s administration—including speechwriter 
William Safire and eventual presidential candidate Pat Buchanan—in attempts to use them 
for the Soviet cause. In each case, the Americans refused the offers.183 
Though most if not all U.S. politicians appear to have known better than to accept 
Soviet offers for aid, the practice may have still been of value to the KGB’s active measures 
apparatus. Directly offering assistance to potential U.S. presidential candidates could have 
served multiple purposes: aside from providing the offered boost to the Kremlin’s desired 
candidates, any accepted offer could have also served as leverage for blackmail or a 
foolproof way to ruin the acceptor’s reputation should the relationship ever sour. In 
addition, any evidence that an offer of assistance was made, or that contact between foreign 
influence agents and anyone involved in a candidate’s campaign or administration had 
taken place, could be used by that candidate’s opponents or detractors. Opponents could 
use evidence of a Russian attempt to render aid to smear or slander the candidate as corrupt, 
even if the candidate rejected the offer. Additionally, if a credible suggestion that the 
Kremlin might have influenced a U.S. election or compromised a lawmaker were 
introduced in the American press or even leaked deliberately by Soviet agents, domestic 
and international belief in the legitimacy of elected leaders could be undermined, which 
would then lead to a constitutional crisis.  
According to Mitrokhin’s archives, the KGB launched a concerted effort to doom 
hawkish anti-Soviet Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s presidential aspirations in 1976 by 
forging FBI documents falsely indicating that he was a homosexual (at a time when U.S. 
voters were seen as likely to reject such a candidate), and distributing them to his political 
rivals, as well as popular magazines in hopes that the rumor would catch on.184 Though no 
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evidence suggests these rumors played a significant role in derailing Jackson’s presidential 
bid, the KGB continued attacking the Senator by disseminating forged documents 
regarding his sexual preferences more than a year after he ended his campaign.185 
B. MODERN MEDDLING IN U.S. ELECTIONS  
The initial years after the Soviet Union’s collapse marked an apparent respite in 
concerted Russian attempts to influence the outcome of Western elections, but by the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, it became increasingly clear that the lull was 
over. Particularly since 2014, the concept and scope of Russian interference campaigns has 
become extremely well known in Western nations, even as Moscow issues repeated 
denials. Along with U.S. elections, allegations of Russian interference have surfaced in 
recent British, Bulgarian, German, French, Scottish, Spanish, and Ukrainian elections and 
referenda within a five-year period.186 One of the largest and arguably most consequential 
Kremlin attempts to tip the scales for or against political candidates in recent years is the 
2016 U.S. presidential election, in which a variety of mechanisms were allegedly deployed 
in support of candidate Donald Trump and against Putin foe Hillary Clinton. This section 
attempts to analyze the various subversive avenues Russia used in its attempt to sway the 
election, as well as a few others occurring in the same general timeframe, to include overt 
Russian media, social media, hacking theft, and other cyberattacks.  
1. State-Run Media 
In 2017, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) released an interagency 
report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, which revealed that the 
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nation had used both overt and covert means to affect the outcome. This document 
extensively referenced state-owned media outlets RT and Sputnik and highlighted their 
role in attempting to tilt the previous year’s U.S. presidential election in favor of Trump.187 
The report cites the Kremlin-backed media companies’ frequent denigration of Democratic 
candidate Hillary Clinton and the U.S. presidential election process as a calculated, years-
long program aimed specifically at damaging her electability. Russia’s English-language 
media outlets are not only used to spread negative information, to be sure. These news 
networks also take advantage of their apparent legitimacy as news sources to boost 
coverage of events and political actors not widely covered by traditional media, and thus 
boost the candidates’ profiles and expand their audiences. Far-left U.S. Green Party 
presidential candidate Jill Stein, derided by many Democratic Party supporters as an 
unserious candidate whose presence on the ballot served primarily to split the liberal vote, 
and thus, to benefit Republicans, received outsized support and publicity from RT and 
Sputnik during the 2012 and 2016 presidential campaigns.188 Such support included a 
number of interviews and a primetime 2016-debate broadcast that allowed her to showcase 
her campaign platform.189 Stein’s enthusiastic appearance at a 2015 gala celebrating RT’s 
10th anniversary, along with her outspoken advocacy for such Kremlin obsessions as lifting 
Crimea-related sanctions and criticism of Ukraine, raised alarm in light of the DNI 
report.190 Evidently suspicious of RT’s outsized coverage of Stein, the U.S. Senate 
Investigative Committee in 2017 announced a probe of her campaign to look for evidence 
of illegal Russian support.191 Stein denied any improper collusion with the Kremlin but 
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initially resisted cooperating with the investigations, and at least two separate reports 
commissioned by the U.S. Senate found strong evidence of longstanding Russian support 
for her campaigns beginning soon after RT’s launch.192 Such support was not 
unprecedented, as RT had also frequently played host to former Republican congressman 
Ron Paul, one of Stein’s 2012 presidential election opponents.193 For his part, Paul, who 
conducted three combative, nontraditional populist presidential campaigns as a Libertarian 
and a Republican, has been described as one of the most outspoken defenders of Putin ever 
to have held U.S. federal office.194 RT also provided significant support and airtime to 
former Minnesota governor and professional wrestler Jesse Ventura, an avid conspiracy 
theorist and U.S. government critic who occasionally announces exploratory presidential 
campaigns.195  
Though not a candidate himself, U.S. Lieutenant General Michael Flynn was also 
frequently invited to appear as a guest speaker on RT to advocate for positions supported 
by the Kremlin.196 A sharp critic of U.S. foreign policy since being ousted from his role as 
President Obama’s Defense Intelligence Agency director, Flynn found a very receptive 
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audience for his criticisms in RT.197 Flynn’s acceptance of $45,000 from the network to 
give a speech at the same network gala Stein attended later played a role in his forced 
resignation as President Trump’s National Security Advisor due to improper contacts with 
the Russian ambassador before Obama’s term ended, along with a federal indictment and 
trial that dragged on for the entirety of Trump’s presidency.198  
2. Social Media 
On the covert side of its operation, Russia’s attempts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. 
election made extensive use of its internet troll and bot armies on U.S.-based social media 
platforms. Even as Western newspapers began to grapple with the trolls’ invasion of online 
comments sections, such social media titans as Facebook and Twitter appeared clueless or 
unconcerned by contrast. Just after Trump’s victory in November 2016, Facebook founder 
Mark Zuckerberg publicly scoffed at accusations that fake news on social media or foreign 
manipulation of the platform had any noteworthy impact, and insisted, “to think it 
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At the same time, however, Facebook offered to embed staff in both the Trump and 
Clinton campaigns to help them use company algorithms to tailor paid content to optimal 
audiences; the company was clearly confident that its advertising service could be used to 
influence voters.200 Additionally, the social media giant accepted Russian rubles as 
payment from a company buying more than $100,000 worth of divisive U.S. political ads; 
thus, arguably, Facebook also knew or should have known that foreign entities were using 
the platform to attempt to exert their own influence on the election.201 See Figure 1. To 
Facebook’s credit, it evidently had alerted the FBI of anomalous domestic political activity 
originating from Russia that it had detected on its platform in June 2016. Unfortunately, 
the company misidentified the nature of the abnormal activity as relating to possible 
espionage rather than an election influence campaign, and thus missed an important early 
signal of the operation.202 
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Targeted Facebook Advertisement identified as part of a Russian interference effort, paid 
for in Rubles and advertising a Russian-operated page sharing additional content. 
Figure 1. Back the Badge Facebook Advertisement.203 
Approximately one year after the election, Facebook executives were called to 
appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the role the platform unwittingly 
played in Russia’s influence campaign. At this hearing, a company representative testified 
that internal analysis showed that Russian influence agents had reached 126 million unique 
users over a period of three years leading up to the 2016 election.204 These figures included 
at least 3,517 advertisements purchased by the IRA as highly targeted sponsored content 
(e.g., paid posts seen only by a narrow audience fitting demographics specified by the 
advertiser). Much more of the volume came from the creation of interest-based groups and 
false American identities producing and sharing such free content as pop culture-based 
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memes, however.205 The campaign also exploited the company’s subsidiary photo- and 
video-sharing site Instagram, which hosted at least 170 Russian interference-linked 
accounts and duplicated a number of the insidious ads purchased on Facebook.206 Russia’s 
disinformation was then amplified on both sites by unsuspecting Americans sharing and 
reposting the tainted content to even wider audiences.207 See Figures 2 and 3. Content 
known or suspected to have come from coordinated Russian activity covered a wide range 
of election-adjacent topics, including but not limited to the following: 
• promotion or attack of political policies 
• commentary on social issues 
• inflammatory religious imagery  
• election logistics disinformation, such as false advertisements with phone 
numbers encouraging readers to text their votes rather than waiting in line 
at a polling location.208 
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Targeted Russian Facebook advertisement, paid in rubles, attempting to capitalize on social 
and political issues by promoting its “Stop All Invaders/Stop A.I.” page in May 2016. 
Figure 2. Stop A.I. (AKA Stop All Invaders) Facebook Advertisement.209 
 
209 Source: Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Social Media Advertisements, 2016, 




Russian Facebook advertisements using incendiary racial and social content to drive traffic to a fake Black 
social justice website operated by the IRA and narrowly targeted to Facebook users within 25 miles of 
Cleveland and Minneapolis, in the final weeks before the 2016 U.S. election. A Senate Intelligence 
Committee report found that “no single group of Americans was targeted by IRA information operatives 
more than African-Americans” and that two-thirds of IRA Facebook advertisements included words related 
to race; the report also illuminated efforts to dissuade African-Americans from voting in 2016, or to support 
Green Party candidate Jill Stein. 
Figure 3. BM (AKA Black Matters) Facebook Advertisement.210 
Exact figures on Kremlin-produced content are unattainable for a variety of 
reasons. Deleted or suspended accounts cannot always be recovered for review, definitively 
identifying the origin of every single well-produced fake profile is likely impossible, and 
distinguishing impersonators and amplifier accounts from authentic users is challenging. 
Nevertheless, a sense of the scope and breadth of Russia’s operation can be gleaned from 
a review of statistics put forth by social media companies and investigative reports 
following the 2016 election.211 At the same Senate Judiciary Committee hearing where 
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Facebook disclosed its initial findings, Google admitted its streaming platform YouTube 
had been host to more than 43 hours of content across over 1,100 videos produced by 
suspected Russian interference agents. Google also shared that its AdSense online 
advertisement service had accepted more than $4,700 from the IRA to advertise on web 
pages and in search results.212 In its turn at the same hearing, Twitter divulged the discovery 
of more than 2,700 IRA-affiliated accounts that had produced 130,000 tweets.213  
Each of these platforms substantially raised the totals in subsequent reporting on 
Russian interference in the ensuing months and years as investigations continued. In 
October 2018, Twitter released more than nine million messages generated by 3,841 IRA-
linked accounts.214 Facebook later announced that it had deleted roughly 583 million 
fraudulent accounts and 837 million spam posts in the first quarter of 2018 alone, and that 
it believed that an additional four percent of its more than two billion active users were 
likely fake accounts that had gone undetected.215 Though Russian interference was not 
likely responsible for every one of these fraudulent accounts, the sheer volume highlights 
the high degree of vulnerability of social platforms to misuse and illustrates the tremendous 
difficulty of detection and removal on so grand a scale.216 Concurrently with Facebook and 
Twitter’s announcements, such additional platforms as blog-hosting site Tumblr were 
found to have been exploited as well. After first reporting the suspension of 84 accounts 
that the company says “engaged in state-sponsored disinformation and propaganda 
campaigns” in March 2018 following months of media pressure, Tumblr added an 
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One of the reasons Russia’s 2016 social media influence campaign escaped 
mainstream scrutiny for as long as it did likely owed to its ability to tailor specific messages 
to different groups.218 By partitioning the content, Russian actors ensured that only those 
likely to accept or appreciate a given message would even see it; indeed, the Senate 
Judiciary hearings into Russian social media influence campaigns indicated that much of 
the content was tailored and distributed to specific audiences.219 While the trolls may have 
simply exploited publicly visible biographical and interest-based information on users’ 
social media profile pages and user-generated content, they also may have capitalized on 
the availability of public records data in U.S. jurisdictions and thus extrapolated this data 
by using political or societal stereotypes.220  
Worryingly, speculation abounded in the months after the 2016 election that 
Russia’s targeted influence efforts may have also relied on criminally obtained 
information. One popular early theory was that Russian hackers might have stolen voter 
data by hacking the Democratic or Republican National Committee or even election 
commission offices.221 Another incendiary accusation was that the Trump campaign might 
have provided information about voter rolls to the Russian operatives.222 Though neither 
story was proven, the implication is terrifying; immense troves of data concerning potential 
voters exist in nearly all developed Western democracies. Much of this data is maintained 
 
218 Filipe N. Ribeiro et al., “On Microtargeting Socially Divisive Ads: A Case Study of Russia-Linked 
Ad Campaigns on Facebook,” in Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and 
Transparency—FAT* ‘19, 140–49, January 29, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1145/3287560.3287580. 
219 S., Committee on the Judiciary. 
220 Robert E. Walker, “Combating Strategic Weapons of Influence on Social Media” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=828243. 
221 Violet Blue, “What If Russian Voter Hacks Were Just Part of Its Facebook Ad Campaign?,” 
Engadget, October 6, 2017, https://www.engadget.com/2017-10-06-russian-voter-hacks-support-facebook-
ad-campaign.html. 
222 Peter Stone and Greg Gordan, “Trump-Russia Investigators Probe Jared Kushner-Run Digital 
Operation,” McClatchey DC Bureau, July 12, 2017, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-
world/national/article160803619.html; Issie Lapowsky, “Did Trump’s Data Team Help Russians? 
Facebook Might Have the Answer,” Wired, July 14, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/trump-russia-data-
parscale-facebook/; Martin Longman, “Did the Russians Mess with the Voter Rolls?,” Washington 
Monthly, June 1, 2018, https://washingtonmonthly.com/2018/06/01/did-the-russians-mess-with-the-voter-
rolls/. 
65 
by private entities outside the federal government’s purview to protect or regulate.223 
Moreover, nearly all this data can be obtained through a variety of means, to include 
legitimate purchases, theft, espionage, or collusion with a compromised actor. 
4. Hacking and Cyberattacks 
One of the most widely known and consequential examples of Russia’s use of 
cyberattacks to influence an election is the hacking, attributed to the GRU, of the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Hillary Clinton campaign team members’ 
emails around 2016. According to a July 2018 indictment filed by Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller against 12 GRU officers, the intelligence agency used a variety of techniques 
including spearfishing through spoofed Google security notification messages and 
Microsoft files.224 Once inside the DNC’s networks, they monitored staff activity, 
implanted malware, and stole additional documents. The intrusion was not wholly 
unnoticed, but it was not stopped. The FBI had alerted the DNC of suspicious Russian-
based activity on their servers on multiple occasions beginning in September 2015, though 
miscommunications and insufficient technical scans within the DNC failed to act properly 
on these tips.225  
In June 2016, the hackers used anonymous online personas called DCLeaks and 
Guccifer 2.0 to “leak” selectively and promote links to thousands of the emails and other 
documents to the public without revealing obvious Kremlin fingerprints. The hackers also 
appeared to partner with WikiLeaks, a renowned international trafficker of stolen 
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information and government secrets.226 U.S. media outlets reported extensively on the 
contents of the emails each time a new batch was released, to damaging effect; a Columbia 
Journalism Review study conducted after the election argued that The New York Times’ 
extreme focus on the hack and leak played an outsized role in costing Clinton the 
presidency.227 Among other controversial issues, information in the emails revealed DNC 
chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s apparent bias toward Clinton and disdain for 
her primary opponent Bernie Sanders.228 This disclosure led to Wasserman Schultz’s 
immediate resignation on the eve of the Democratic National Convention, as well as high 
tension between Sanders and Clinton supporters that overshadowed Clinton’s nomination 
ceremony and potentially cost her some of the Sanders supporters’ votes in the general 
election.229  
Somewhat surprisingly, Moscow’s scheme with the stolen emails was not entirely 
met with bipartisan condemnation, and may have even received some measure of tacit 
encouragement. In July 2016, Trump generated a scandal by publicly asking Russia to “find 
the 30,000 emails that are missing” from Clinton’s server during a televised campaign 
speech, saying Moscow’s hackers would “probably be rewarded mightily by our press” for 
doing so.230 Occurring soon after public reports that intelligence officials believed Russia 
was behind the DNC server hack emerged, Trump’s request was criticized by some as a 
literal entreaty to an adversarial foreign state to intervene on his behalf in the election via 
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illegal activity.231 In 2017, reports emerged that Trump’s son Donald Jr. and son-in-law 
Jared Kushner, along with Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort, had met with a 
Kremlin-linked Russian attorney offering damaging information about the Clintons the 
same week that documents stolen from the email hack were released.232 To Trump’s rage 
and dismay, his opponents seized on this meeting, along with inconsistent explanations of 
it from Trump and his legal advisors, to accuse his campaign of collusion with Russia in 
the hacking and influence campaign or at least inappropriate behavior in the face of 
improper offers of assistance from a top U.S. foe.233  
Moscow’s hacking efforts targeted not just communications and documents from 
political campaigns, but also attacked U.S. election infrastructure; a chilling escalation that 
has the potential to cause longer-term damage to democratic societies than the defeat of a 
single candidate. Two months before the 2016 election, U.S. voters were alarmed by 
reports that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had detected hacking attempts 
on the election systems of 21 states, with Russia as the likely culprit.234 A month before 
that disclosure, the Illinois Board of Elections had already confirmed that its database of 
registered voters had been breached in what the FBI considered a sophisticated foreign 
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attack.235 In July 2018, the office of Special Counsel Mueller took action on these claims 
and announced an indictment charging that two GRU operatives probed websites and 
networks of counties in Georgia, Florida, and Iowa for back-end server vulnerabilities one 
week before the 2016 election.236 In 2019, reports from the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
DHS, and FBI eventually acknowledged that Russia had actually attacked the election 
infrastructure of all 50 U.S. states in 2016, with a possible intent to use the fruits of these 
attacks at a later time.237 
C. OTHER MODERN RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE FOREIGN 
ELECTIONS 
Such a multi-faceted and sophisticated blitz (e.g., support for preferred candidates, 
slander against opponents, media manipulation, internet trolls, cyberattacks, and other 
interference tactics) has troubled democratic elections across the world. In fact, the United 
States could have looked toward NATO partner Bulgaria’s elections in 2015 and 2016 as 
a warning of the potential danger to come in its own election cycle. On the day of its local 
elections and referendum on future electronic voting in 2015, the networks of Bulgaria’s 
Central Elections Commission and various government ministries were besieged by a 
DDoS attack.238 Such assaults are commonly used to overwhelm sites and servers with 
automated connection requests to the point of a catastrophic crash. The Central Election 
Commission announced that it was confident that the integrity of the results remained intact 
despite the attack, but subsequent U.S. government and private sector analysis of the attack 
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accusing GRU as the culprit raised alarms about the extent of Russian influence 
campaigns.239  
Ahead of the country’s 2016 presidential election, multiple Bulgarian government 
officials reported that its national security service had intercepted an election strategy 
dossier produced by a Kremlin-linked Russian think tank and prepared for Bulgaria’s 
Socialist Party.240 Delivered by a Russian official sanctioned by the United States for 
spying, the document proposed the distribution of false polling data favoring the party’s 
candidate and anti-NATO position to help the party win.241 Polls predicting the Socialist 
Party candidate’s victory and alleging that a majority of Bulgarians trusted Russia more 
than NATO had indeed mysteriously surfaced during the election campaign season.242 The 
poll had been conducted by a mysterious Bulgarian company called Gallup International, 
which bore no relation to and was the target of a name-infringement lawsuit from renowned 
U.S.-based polling company Gallup Incorporated.243 Per former Bulgarian ambassador to 
Russia, Ilian Vassilev, regarding the anti-NATO Gallup International report: 
This wrapped-in-secrecy poll had no details on methodology nor funding 
sources. Russian media strategists and their Bulgarian proxies used the 
Western name to fool people about its credibility and spread their 
message.244 
Along with this assessment, Vassilev published a warning about Russia’s use of RT, 
Sputnik, and various proxies to sway the Bulgarian vote and ultimately drive the nation out 
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of NATO.245 In the end, the Socialist Party’s preferred candidate, Rumen Radev, won the 
election and became president.246 
The attack on Bulgaria’s elections system was not unprecedented, as Russia had 
allegedly attempted the same in Ukraine one year prior during its 2014 presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Days before the election, self-proclaimed Russian “hacktivists” 
hacked the Central Election Commission’s website in an effort to publish false information 
declaring a well-known far-right extremist as the election winner.247 Not long after this 
came to light, the head of Ukraine’s SBU security service announced two days before the 
election that a virus meant to destroy election results had been detected and removed from 
its Central Election Center services.248 
At the same time Bulgaria and the United States endured Russian election 
interference campaigns, yet another NATO country found itself in the Kremlin’s 
crosshairs. French National Rally candidate Marine Le Pen’s 2016–2017 presidential 
campaign benefited from $13 million in loans from a Moscow bank, likely approved and 
quite possibly directed by the Kremlin.249 This substantial funding was seen as vital to 
keeping the once-fringe candidate’s campaign afloat, and helped her achieve a shocking 
second-place finish. During a highly publicized meeting between Le Pen and Putin ahead 
of the election, the Russian leader appeared to be trying hard not to smile as he ominously 
stated that “of course” Russia did not want to meddle in the French election.250 Such outside 
support has been critical to National Rally’s survival as French and other Western banks 
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had refused to finance a party seen by many as racist and xenophobic.251 A BBC report 
citing hacked emails and conversations with multiple Le Pen associates heavily suggested 
prior clandestine meetings between Le Pen and Putin and detailed her intended role in 
legitimizing Russia’s Crimea annexation.252 It should be noted that financial support 
offered by Russia is often obscured through intermediaries for plausible deniability, and 
that support need not be explicitly monetary.253 Hungary’s Political Capital Policy 
Research and Consulting Institute opined in 2014 that in exchange for fealty to the Kremlin, 
parties are given “valuable professional, organizational and media assistance, i.e., access 
to networks and political know-how.”254 
During France’s 2017 presidential election, Russia’s state-run Sputnik news agency 
published false reports that François Fillon had overtaken Emmanuel Macron as Le Pen’s 
strongest challenger.255 At minimum, the ploy seemed geared to ensure that her opponent 
in a potential runoff round would be Filion—another Russia-friendly, NATO-criticizing 
candidate—rather than Kremlin skeptic Macron.256 Russian foreign media relentlessly 
attacked and smeared Macron throughout France’s election season with a wide variety of 
topics and tactics.257 Sputnik and other Russian media outlets published baseless 
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accusations that Macron was homosexual, mentally ill, and financially supported by a 
mysterious and powerful “gay lobby.”258 
The Kremlin also repeated the hack-and-leak stunt it used against the Clinton 
campaign during its interference in France’s presidential election, albeit with diminished 
success. Two days before the 2017 presidential election runoff between Le Pen and 
Macron, nine gigabytes of data stolen from the Macron campaign including 21,075 emails 
were posted to the internet and promoted on social media by a large network of automated 
accounts, as well as WikiLeaks.259 Disturbingly, the stolen Macron emails were 
purportedly mixed with falsified documents attempting to frame him for fraud; a trick that 
seems difficult for readers to discern or investigators to prove, given the illicit nature of the 
genuine documents’ theft and release.260 Bolstering the theory that Russia had altered the 
emails, a report from the University of Toronto released that same month revealed similar 
tactics used by the GRU against journalist and Putin critic David Satter, whose stolen 
emails were deliberately modified in an effort to smear Putin critic Aleksei Navalny.261 
Such tactics represent a perhaps overlooked element of danger to hacked and stolen 
documents; they can be used as cover to add legitimacy to forgeries that thus put a digital 
twist on an age-old KGB dezinformatsiya trick.  
Possibly due to its mistimed release within the mandatory media blackout period of 
French eve-of-voting “election silence” laws, or perhaps because voters had already made 
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up their minds or were wary of email leaks after the recent Clinton hacking debacle, the 
episode seemingly had no major effect on the election result.262 Though Russia denied 
responsibility, an analysis conducted by cybersecurity company Flashpoint attributed the 
attack to the GRU.263 This finding supported an earlier Trend Micro report warning of 
Russian phishing attempts against Macron and his campaign.264 On October 19, 2020, the 
U.S. Justice Department unsealed indictments against six GRU officers for their roles in 
“spearphishing” hacks against Macron and his party, along with other cyberattacks 
including NotPetya, the Ukraine cyber grid disruption, and a 2018 Winter Olympic Games 
cyberintrusion.265 
These European countries’ recent experiences with Russian election interference 
contain many of the same elements the United States was subjected to in 2014: 
disinformation, media manipulation, leak of stolen documents, forgeries, support for fringe 
candidates, and even attacks on election infrastructure. The diversity, frequency, and broad 
range of Kremlin efforts to intervene in its rivals’ electoral affairs, along with the obvious 
harm manipulating the outcome of a country’s democratic process can cause in the short 
and long term, illustrate that election interference may be the most potent and dangerous 
of Russia’s covert influence tactics. 
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IV. FALLOUT AND VULNERABILITIES 
This chapter explores a range of vulnerabilities and possible consequences faced 
by the U.S. should such attacks on elections succeed. To do so, this chapter explores several 
examples of fallout from Russia’s efforts against the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 
Though the Special Counsel finding and myriad intelligence reports definitively 
point to deliberate Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election in support of a Trump 
victory, assessing the operation’s effect on the outcome is necessarily an inexact science. 
While it is impossible to know, for example, how many voters would have chosen Clinton 
rather than Trump, Stein, or another option had it not been for encounters with Russian 
disinformation or the leaked email controversy specifically, it is not difficult to trace clear 
examples of damage to the Kremlin plot.  
One obvious consequence of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election was 
reputational harm for candidates and their surrogates. For one, the email leaks had a 
demonstrable effect on the DNC when Wasserman Schultz resigned as chairwoman due to 
the content of her exposed conversations.266 Media coverage and public perception in light 
of the strategically damaging leaks was undeniably negative for Clinton as she sought to 
win over undecided and reluctant voters. Trump, his family, and his campaign team all 
clearly viewed coverage of the Trump Tower meeting and other allegations of the 
campaign’s ties to Russia as unpalatable, given their efforts to deny accusations and shut 
down the Special Counsel investigation. Jill Stein, too, bristled at accusations that her 
campaign had been supported by Russia once the investigations of interference triggered 
additional scrutiny of her warm relationship with RT.267 It is clear, however, that 
reputational harm from the fallout of Moscow’s meddling extended far beyond that of 
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political candidates and their campaign associates, likely to an extent that surprised even 
the leaders of the malign influence operations. 
Another example of how the ever-present possibility of Moscow meddling can lead 
to confusion and controversy occurred in October 2019, when a quote by Hillary Clinton 
warning that Russia was likely “grooming” a third-party disrupter like Stein to help defeat 
the 2020 Democratic candidate made waves in the media.268 Many U.S. news outlets 
reported that Clinton had accused 2020 Democratic presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard 
of being a Russian asset, which then prompted a public feud between the two that led other 
2020 Democratic candidates to take sides amid a small rift within the party.269 Such 
organizations as the Alliance for Securing Democracy reported that Gabbard received 
outsized coverage on RT and that “bot-like activity” periodically boosts her profile on 
social media.270 This finding raised several alarming possibilities, including that Russia 
could have either been boosting Gabbard as Clinton insinuated, or that it could be framing 
her as a distraction or a form of campaign-sinking slander. Even if the accusation could be 
proved false, this incident could nevertheless illustrate how the specter of Russian 
interference can be weaponized against a candidate and contribute to division without 
Russia even having to take action. This incident—and its knock-on effects—were only 
possible because of successful Russian influence operations and the effect it had on U.S. 
voters’ perceptions. 
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Notably, Gabbard, Stein, and Trump have all publicly labeled criticism of their 
seemingly pro-Russia policies and associations as “McCarthyist.”271 McCarthyism 
describes a period of time in which the U.S. government subjected thousands of its own 
citizens to loyalty tests, harsh investigations, and accusations of treason in service of the 
Soviet Union.272 Though Soviet espionage undeniably posed a threat at the time, this period 
is generally regarded negatively due to government overreach, baseless political 
persecutions, and exaggerated fears of communist influence.273 Today, RT journalists 
repeatedly publish articles decrying “McCarthyism’s return” in an effort to protest 
mounting restrictions against their operation in Western countries.274 Such disingenuous 
protests are reminiscent of Kim Philby, the notorious London Times journalist and Soviet 
double agent within British intelligence services who provided Moscow with top-secret 
communications between U.S. and British operatives in the CIA and MI6. Philby claimed 
to be an innocent victim of McCarthyist slander when his cover began to be blown, and 
used the success of his disingenuous protest to prolong his espionage for a time.275 Though 
erroneously exonerated of the accusations, Philby did resign from his position at MI6 amid 
ongoing speculation; though he continued work as a journalist, his value to the Kremlin 
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was greatly diminished. Eventually outed by a Soviet defector, Philby ultimately defected 
himself, but received a cooler-than-anticipated reception in the Soviet Union.276  
Ultimately, the 2016 U.S. election influence campaign paid more dividends than 
even Russia likely expected. One likely unplanned windfall of the DNC and Clinton 
campaign hacking operation for Moscow is that the U.S. response to the attack managed 
to entangle the FBI, long a target of Soviet dezinformatsiya smear campaigns, in extreme 
controversy that tarnished its reputation among a significant portion of the U.S. population. 
The Clinton email leaks added fuel to an ongoing, unrelated scandal regarding her improper 
use of a private email server for official business during her tenure as Secretary of State, 
as it hinted the possibility of security breaches with classified information.277 This 
development put FBI director James Comey in a bind as he struggled to decide what the 
bureau should and should not disclose to the public about both the private server 
investigation and the DNC hack investigation, because he feared any disclosures could 
imply or reveal improper conduct by a presidential candidate and thus potentially impact 
voters’ choices.278 Comey’s decisions on these matters led many Democrats to accuse him 
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of demonstrating undue bias against Clinton and deliberately swinging the election for 
Trump.279  
Notably, Comey’s decisions were said to have been influenced by another facet of 
Russian interference and disinformation: the FBI’s discovery of a suspicious Russian 
intelligence document alleging that Attorney General Loretta Lynch had pre-emptively 
reassured Clinton’s team that the server investigation would tread softly.280 This document 
involved purported but possibly fabricated emails involving Lynch and Wasserman 
Schultz.281 Though the bureau’s own analysis concluded that the report was unreliable and 
possibly deliberately manufactured to fluster U.S. intelligence agencies, its existence 
helped persuade Comey that a public explanation was needed as a defensive measure 
against future accusations of corruption.282  
Unfortunately, for the FBI, Trump, along with many of his supporters, came to view 
Comey as biased against him due to the bureau’s further investigation into Russian 
interference after the election, as it implied that Trump’s narrow victory might have been 
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assisted by a top rival state.283 Trump also complained throughout his presidency that 
Comey and a cabal of “deep state” actors within the DOJ and FBI had engaged in illegal 
spying activity against his campaign to prevent or end his presidency.284 Post-election 
polling indicates that the bureau experienced a loss of trust from both Congress and a 
significant portion of the U.S. population immediately following these episodes.285 A 2018 
poll conducted by Penn State University found that since this episode, voters who lean 
Republican or independent trusted the FBI less than half the time, and that less than half of 
Americans believed that “most FBI agents enforce the law fairly.”286 
Other U.S. government intelligence agencies suffered from the fallout from 
Russia’s election interference as well. The DNI released a declassified joint CIA, National 
Security Agency (NSA), and FBI report two months after the 2016 election, which 
unequivocally accused the Kremlin of meddling in the election to Trump’s benefit:  
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 
aimed at the U.S. presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine 
public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and 
harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and 
the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect 
Trump… Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect 
Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton 
and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him…Moscow’s influence 
campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert 
intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by 
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Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third party 
intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.”287 
Upset that it undermined the degree or legitimacy of his victory, Trump forcefully rejected 
the report’s finding even before it was published.288 In December 2016, he issued a derisive 
rebuttal to the CIA’s reported findings that starkly undermined his own intelligence 
agency’s credibility, “These are the same people that said Saddam Hussein had weapons 
of mass destruction.”289 
Siding with a principal U.S. adversary over his own intelligence community, Trump 
repeatedly insisted that he believed Putin’s denials about responsibility for the hack.290 On 
multiple occasions, Trump also suggested that the operation could have been the work of 
China, other countries, a morbidly obese domestic hacker, or even the DNC itself as a 
distraction from Clinton’s private server scandal.291 The public spat touched off lasting 
friction between Trump and the intelligence agencies, particularly once Trump expressed 
public disdain for the Special Counsel investigation and sought a one-on-one meeting with 
Putin without alerting or consulting the DNI.292 
The outgoing administration struggled to respond appropriately to the Clinton email 
release operation as it unfolded. President Obama initially chose to tread lightly and sought 
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to avoid appearing to aid Clinton’s chances of victory.293 Later deciding to alert the public 
of Russia’s hand in election manipulation, Obama found himself thwarted by Mitch 
McConnell, the Republican Senate Majority Leader.294 McConnell espoused skepticism of 
the available intelligence and refused to cooperate in a joint warning about election 
interference.295 DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson’s offer to provide state election officials with 
federal cybersecurity assistance was similarly thwarted by incidents such as Georgia 
Secretary of State Brian Kemp accusing the Obama administration of “a politically 
calculated move” and refusing to cooperate lest the Democratic administration seek to use 
the situation to aid its party’s candidates in some way.296  
The Obama administration’s eventual punitive response—the expulsion of 35 
Russian diplomats and the closure of two Russian embassy compounds—resulted in further 
collateral damage to the credibility of certain U.S. government officials when curiosity 
regarding Russia’s uncharacteristic restraint from retaliation later ensnared two members 
of Trump’s cabinet in scandals.297 Mike Flynn, Trump’s National Security Advisor, was 
found to have engaged in, and lied to the FBI and administration officials about, 
undisclosed conversations with Russia’s ambassador to the United States before Trump 
took office, along with other omissions such as failing to report a $45,000 payment for his 
speech at the RT gala referenced earlier.298 These findings led to Flynn’s swift departure 
from Trump’s cabinet, which sparked investigations surrounding his alleged service as an 
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undisclosed foreign agent and potential violations of the U.S. Constitution’s Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, and eventually drew indictments and a guilty plea from Flynn.299  
Attorney General Jeff Sessions was also embroiled in controversy over his own 
initially undisclosed contacts with the Russian ambassador prior to Trump’s inauguration, 
when Sessions was a U.S. senator.300 Amid calls for his resignation from Senate Democrats 
who felt he had misled them by failing to inform them of these contacts, Sessions swiftly 
recused himself from any DOJ investigations regarding Russian election interference.301 
Sessions’ recusal led to the appointment of a Special Counsel investigation led by former 
FBI Director Robert Mueller, which infuriated Trump and ultimately led to Sessions’s 
forced departure.302 
Furious at accusations that his campaign had colluded with Russia, Trump sought 
to discredit the Special Counsel investigation throughout its duration by decrying it as a 
witch hunt and accusing Mueller and his team of being “angry Democrats” and “Trump 
haters” with a partisan agenda to sabotage him.303 The investigation ultimately led to, 
among other things, 14 referrals of criminal matters to the DOJ, 37 indictments, and a 
report finding “numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump campaign” 
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along with evidence of “sweeping and systemic” Kremlin election interference.304 William 
Barr, Sessions’ eventual successor as Attorney General, generated controversy and 
questions of credibility by issuing a summary letter of the Special Counsel report to the 
congressional Judiciary Committees in March 2019 that appeared to gloss over some of 
the report’s findings.305 This report was assailed by many legal analysts, journalists, and 
Special Counsel members, including Mueller himself, as an inadequate or even deliberately 
misleading portrayal of the investigation’s findings. The ensuing controversy resulted in 
further accusations of DOJ partisan corruption, and led to more than 2,000 former DOJ 
employees publicly calling for Barr’s resignation, as well as 27 members of the DC Bar 
requesting sanctions against him in a formal disciplinary complaint.306 In aggregate, the 
nation’s top law enforcement, justice administration, and intelligence bodies weathered a 
torrent of attacks on their credibility in the course of investigating Russian interference in 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Historically low faith in the DOJ, FBI, and intelligence 
community is an indisputable boon for future Russian election interference attempts.  
As with the AIDS and Kennedy assassination dezinformatsiya episodes, Russia 
could not have predicted or controlled the aftermath and consequences of their initial 
cyberattack against the DNC and social media trolling campaign, but can only be delighted 
by the outsized and lingering results. As it stands, the fallout of a hacking and 
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disinformation operation perpetrated by the Russian government helped induce a 
staggering amount of damage to a variety of targets. These include but are not limited to 
the following: 
• undermining Clinton’s election campaign and damaging her prospects of 
victory 
• sowing lasting discord within the DNC 
• alienating and enraging potential left-leaning voters who had favored 
Sanders 
• setting in motion multiple events resulting in distrust for the FBI and DOJ 
and the ruination of prominent officials’ careers 
• provoking lasting animosity between Trump and the U.S. intelligence 
community 
• creating legal and political headaches along with embarrassing distractions 
for Trump, his children, and associates 
• spurring the firing and criminal prosecution of the National Security 
Advisor  
• leaving a large number of U.S. citizens believing their leader conspired 
with a major U.S. foe to take power 
The degree of damage to the credibility of U.S. government leaders and institutions 
affected by Russia’s 2016 interference campaign is varied and difficult to quantify, but it 
is undeniable that some harm was sustained; and worryingly, could occur again. Even 
where evidence of Kremlin interference is elusive, the specter of such attacks hangs over 
subsequent elections and stokes long-term damage in voters’ faith that elections are secure 
and free of outside tampering. 
To wit, a minor incident in the 2020 U.S. presidential election offered a warning 
that the specter of Russian interference remains, and is still capable of inflicting damage 
86 
on the nation and its leaders. With early voting already underway, The New York Post 
controversially published a trove of emails allegedly sent to and from the son of 
Democratic candidate Joe Biden.307 Many media outlets and analysts investigating the 
story identified significant questions about its veracity, including speculation that 
suspected and indicted Russian influence agents had provided the material to a U.S. 
intermediary.308 Within days, reports emerged that an FBI investigation had been launched 
regarding whether the emails were hacked and doctored as part of a foreign disinformation 
campaign.309 Soon after, the DNI, John Ratcliffe, publicly denied the ongoing investigation 
and declared the story “not part of some Russian disinformation campaign” and excoriated 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence chairman Adam Schiff for publicly 
linking the story to a Russian disinformation plot.310 Notably, Facebook and Twitter both 
took immediate steps to limit posts linking to the Post article due to its questionable 
veracity, its use of possibly stolen private personal information, and its status as possible 
election-related disinformation; decisions that Trump campaign officials immediately 
decried as undue election interference by the social media titans.311 While this incident 
does not appear to have had a major impact on the election results, it illustrates the fact that 
either Russian interference or accusations thereof may be an ever-present facet of future 
elections and has the capacity to provoke questions of credibility for U.S. government 
officials tasked with securing elections and national interests.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Investigative findings by bodies including the bipartisan Senate Intelligence 
Committee demonstrate unequivocally that Russia’s preferred influence operation 
outcomes in the 2016 U.S. presidential election came to pass, potentially along with 
“victories” in other elections.312 Much argument and investigation has ensued over the 
degree to which Kremlin meddling influenced such outcomes, but its presence and 
potential is virtually undeniable. With nearly a century of experience in covert influence 
techniques and plenty of practice trying to interfere in Western elections, Russia has many 
skills and tools, such as disinformation and cyberattacks with which to continue meddling 
in the democratic affairs of its rivals. The persistence of such decades-old Soviet-made 
myths as the Pentagon AIDS connection and Kennedy assassination conspiracies point to 
a sobering truth regarding Russia’s modern disinformation campaigns: it is impossible to 
forecast the long-term effect a given Kremlin fabrication may have, but history strongly 
suggests that at least a few may potentially cause damage even after discovery and 
attribution. Unfortunately, Russia appears all too willing to continue stressing the system 
with a variety of techniques and targets.  
Covert Kremlin operations may be capable of corrupting a political candidate, 
framing one to make it appear that they had, or reaping the paranoia-inducing fruits of prior 
influence campaigns even when not directly intervening in an incident. Examinations of 
Soviet precedent and recent Kremlin tactics in democratic campaigns reveal that true or 
fabricated rumors of corruption and election fraud, exploitation, and exacerbation of 
domestic civil tensions, and even promotion of secession movements and rebellion, loom 
as possible threats. Challenges to the legitimacy of some future elections are plausible, 
whether because of successful Russian interference or even a good faith or disingenuous 
inaccurate accusation of such. These accusations could even be bolstered by a variety of 
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well-honed Kremlin tradecraft, such as the production or dissemination of genuine, 
doctored, or fabricated material designed to lend credence to allegations.  
It is therefore critically important for intelligence communities, investigative 
bodies, and other experts to evaluate the Kremlin’s capacity for future operations, as well 
as their possible response to less favorable outcomes in future campaigns. Russia has the 
motivation, the capability, and a century of experience preparing it for future interference 
in U.S. affairs, and denying them the prize of election-related chaos and ruination of the 
U.S. government and electoral systems’ credibility should be a top priority for national and 
homeland security entities. 
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